Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership and Firm Performance Nexus: An Empirical Analysis

Jegede, Charles Ayodele

Abstract

A firm performance can be traced to its management capability which embodies the structure and composition of its executives. The paper examines the effect of executive compensation structure and ownership on firm performance. A simple random sampling technique was used to sample 240 personnel from cross-section of banks in Lagos State, Nigeria. A structured questionnaire consisting of 25 items as instrument for data collection was employed. The data were analyzed using chi-square technique. The results of the analysis revealed that there is a significant relationship between management ownership and bankrsquo;s market value. However, the finding shows that Executive compensation structures do not affects bankrsquo;s market value. The paper also revealed that among larger commercial banks, size is a key criteria in determining executive compensation as it is significantly but negatively related to compensation. Therefore, there is need to reign in the executive compensation tendencies in smaller banks to favour bigger shareholders who double up as bank directors to the detriment of returns and smaller owners of the bank.

Keywords: Compensation, ownership, performance, banks, Nigeria

INTRODUCTION

Executive compensation is the renumeration package which goes with labour services (Adeyemi, 1991). An International Labour Organization (ILO) publication (1998) describes compensation as payment system based on effort performance and productivity.The objectives of good compensation phiplosophy are to attract, motivate and retain good peole for attainment of the goals of organizations (Adeoti and Isiaka, 2006). To accomplish these goals, companies use a mixture of the three main components of compensation: base pay otherwise known as salary; incentives pay whether in the form of cash or noncash cash such as stock; and benefits, or nonfinancial rewards. Therefore, a pay philosophy is a blend of the three, since the company must pay for whatever it delivers to employees. This study focus on the use of stock plan compensation strategy by organization for achievement of high performance. Dess and Lumpkin (2002) provided a list of principles on the role of stock in executive compensation. They stated that stock-based compensation plan are important element of most compensation programmes and can provide opportunities for managers whose efforts contribute to the creation of shareholders wealth. Proper stock-based plans allow for creation of executive wealth that is reasonable in view of the creation of shareholder wealth management should not prosper while shareholders suffer, have measurable and predictable outcomes that are directly linked to the companyrsquo;s performances, be straight forward and clearly described so that investors and employees can understand them. Dess and Lumpkin (2002) further argue that shareholders rely on the chief executive officers (CEOs) to adopt policies that will maximize the value of their shares. They noted that two set of policies may create the right monetary incentive for the CEOs to maximize the value of their enterprises which include board requirement of CEOs to become substantial owners of enterprises share, and salaries, bonuses and share options structured so as to provide rewards for superior performance and penalties for poor performances. The ability of a manager to achieve the set objectives and importantly at minimum cost depends to a large extent on his/her ability to motivate or compensate his/her subordinates. This is so because the essence of leadership is called followership. The ownership structure is one of the main corporate governance mechanisms influencing the scope of a firmrsquo;s agency cost, Berle and Means (1932) suggest that ownership concentration should have positive effect on performance because it alleviates the conflict of interests between owners and managers. In this sense, concentrated ownership structures leave aside the classic agency problem between managers and shareholder, but lead to a conflict between majority and minority shareholders. Based on background, this study investigates the effect of compensation and ownership structure on firm performance in Nigeria.

Employees Compensation Management

It is pertinent at this juncture to note that compensation management is one of the central pillars of human resources management. It is concerned with the formulation and implementation of strategies and policies that aim to compensate people fairly, equitably and consistently in accordance with their value to the organization (Armstrong, 2005). The task in compensation administration is to develop policies and procedures that will attain maximum return on Naira spent in the terms of attracting, satisfying, retaining and perhaps motivating employees (Anyebe, 2003). The studies on compensation suggest that most annual cash bonus plans for key executive officers are based in large part on accounting performance measures. There is also some relationship between accounting performance and stock based compensation in many firms since the pool of stock options or stock awards to be distributed each year is often based on annual accounting performance measures. The studies have also documented a high correlation in the total annual incentive pay amongst the top executives in each firm, and it is commonly assumed that what is observed for the CEO is representative of the incentive pay for the entire top management team for most entities (Gore et al., 2003; Ittner et al., 1997). In the Nigerian banking sector, executive remuneration has not come under massive spotlight perhaps due to the nature of executive compensation. As opposed to compensation in the more developed markets, executive comp

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高管薪酬结构，所有权和公司业绩之间的关联——实证分析

Jegede, Charles Ayodele

摘要

一家公司的业绩可以追溯至其管理能力，而这种管理能力体现在公司的结构及管理人员的职位。这篇论文研究了管理人员的薪酬制度对公司业绩的影响。我们使用了一种简单的随机抽样技术，挑选出拉各斯州尼日利亚银行的各个部门的240个职工。此外，我们使用了设计完好的调查问卷作为数据收集的手段，这份调查问卷由25个问题组成，并使用卡方检验来分析这些数据。分析结果显示：在管理层薪酬和银行市场价值两者中存在一种显著关系，然而，研究发现表明管理层的薪酬制度并不影响银行的市场价值。这篇论文同时反映：在商业银行中，规模才是决定管理层薪酬的关键要素，而规模与薪酬的关系虽然显著，但是却呈现负相关。因此，我们有必要在更小规模的银行中控制高管薪酬的增长，需要控制高管削减银行利润并保持较少的持有者，从而支持持有双倍股数的股东。

关键词：薪酬，所有权，业绩，银行，尼日利亚

引言

高管薪酬是和劳动服务（阿德亚米，1991）应运而生的。一家国际劳动组织（ILO）出版社（1998）把薪酬认作是以工作表现和生产率为基础的支付体系。优秀的薪酬哲学的目标是吸引、激励并保留优秀人才来实现公司的目标（安德提和伊思阿卡，2006）。为了实现这些目标，公司普遍混合使用薪酬三大组成部分：基本薪酬（工资）；奖金，以现金或非现金形式来偿付，例如股票；以及津贴，或非金融性的奖励。因此，薪酬哲学是这三种组成部分的混合，因为公司必须支付这些。这项研究主要集中在：为了使公司实现好的经营业绩，而使用股票计划薪酬策略。戴斯和朗普金（2002）提供了一系列在高管薪酬中股票作用的准则。他们认为以股票为基础的薪酬计划是大多数薪酬项目中重要的组成部分，并且这种薪酬计划可以为那些致力于创造股东财富的管理人员提供机会。合适的以股票为基础的计划允许创造管理层的财富，从创造股东财富的角度来看，这种管理层的利润是合理的。当股东遭受损失，承担和公司业绩直接相关的可测量并可预测的后果时，管理层不应该独善其身，而是应该直截了当并详细说明从而投资者和雇员可以理解他们。戴斯和朗普金（2002）进一步认为股东会依赖首席执行官（CEOs），从而采纳能够最大化股票价值的政策。她们强调说设置两种策略也许可以创造对CEO来说恰当的金钱激励，从而最大化公司的价值，而这种价值包括董事会对CEO的要求，即成为公司股票、工资、津贴和结构股权的持续拥有者，从而为卓越的绩效提供奖励或者为糟糕的业绩施与惩罚。要实现预定目标并在最小化成本中起到重要作用的管理层，其能力很大程度上取决于他或她激励或补偿其下级的能力。这样做是因为领导力的核心就是伙伴关系。所有者结构是影响一家公司代理机构成本的范围的公司主要治理机制。波利和敏斯（1932）建议所有者集中制度应该对业绩有积极影响，因为它可以减轻所有者和管理层之间的利益冲突。从这方面来说，集中的所有者制度把传统的管理层和所有者之间的利益冲突搁置一旁，但却导致了主要股东和少数股东之间的冲突。基于这种背景，这项研究调查了薪酬对尼日利亚公司业绩的影响。

雇员薪酬管理

在这个衔接处强调薪酬管理是人资管理的重心是很有必要的。薪酬管理与创建并实施战略和策略有关，而这些策略旨在根据雇员对公司的奉献程度，按公平、公正、一致性原则偿付（阿姆斯特朗，2005）。薪酬管理的工作是开发那些能够获取最大回报的策略和程序，这种回报是指在尼日利亚地区，从吸引、满足、挽留还有激励雇员的这些方面投入，从而获取的回报（阿诺比，2003）。有关薪酬的研究表明关键管理人员每年获得的薪酬大部分依赖于会计业绩的衡量。在许多公司中，会计业绩和以股票为基准的薪酬之间也存在某种特定的关系，因为股权池或每年的股利分配总是以每年的会计业绩测量为基准的。这项研究同时验证了在每家公司中的首席执行官和每年总薪酬支付高度相关，同时作出一般假设：对于大多数公司来说，整个高层管理团队的薪酬支付是CEO必须服从的条例（高尔，2003；依托那，1997）。在尼日利亚银行部门，高管薪酬仍未公开，很可能是因为高管薪酬的本质。例如在更发达的市场中，根据各种经营性银行的年报指出的那样，尼利日亚的高管薪酬似乎仅限于现金工资，津贴和现金红利。

研究问题：

两个调查问题主导这篇研究：1.管理层持股会影响银行的价值吗？2.高管薪酬结构会影响银行的市场价值吗？

假设：

1. Ho：在管理层持股和银行的市场价值两者间没有显著关系；

2. Ho：高管薪酬结构不影响银行的市场价值。

方法论

研究设计

为了评估尼日利亚银行的高管薪酬、股权结构和公司业绩之间的关系，修改了这项研究设计。这项研究的数据涵盖了尼日利亚地区的所有银行，但是重心主要集中在银行改革之后由CBN批准的24家银行。但是，由240个职工组成的样本，这其中还包括高层管理人员等其他职工，使用这种简单的随机抽样技术，会改变经过挑选的银行中高层职工。这种做法本打算用来提高这项研究对整个银行业发现的普适性。

这项研究使用的主要研究工具是调查问卷，它是为了确保能够取得真实客观的参考数据而实施的。同时也实施了对个体的采访和对基础参考的观测，这些参考数据都是源自高度混合而凭直觉的受访者的行为。在分发调查问卷之前，起草的问卷复印件一开始都递交给专业性与职业性并存的专家手里，来检验问卷的合理性以及问卷内容的客观合理性。为了确定这项工具的可靠性，在以两个星期为间隔的时期内，我们对这批受访者实施两次操作。我们对拉各斯州的十家银行使用了多次测验可靠性的方法。通过应用皮尔森积矩的相关数据，独立运行的结果是高度相关的。我们得到了相关系数r值为0.78，并认为用这种工具来确定项目相关性是完全足够的。

数据呈现和分析

这项数据分析是从用百分比和表格形式表现的调查问卷的分发和收回开始的，详见下表1：

上图绘制的表1展示了为研究而分发并收回的调查问卷情况。总共收回204份问卷，占据84%。我们认为这个数据对于该项研究来说是可靠的。

假设检验

假设1：管理层所有者权力的增加与银行市场价值呈负相关。测量值X² =47.88，自由度 =4 临界X²=9.488。

假设1的决策

测量值X²=47.88高于临界值X²=9.488，像这样的话，我们取消无用假设，比如：管理层所有者权益的增加与银行市场价值呈正相关。

假设2：高管薪酬结构不影响公司的市场价值。测量值X² =64.14，自由度 =4 临界X²=9.488。

假设2的决策

测量值X²=64.14大于临界值X²=9.488.从此看来，我们要取消无效假设。这意味着高管薪酬结构并不影响公司的市场价值。

发现与讨论

结果表明一位少于公司独享权的主管人员具有采取行动以减少公司价值的动机。并且，哈尔和利伯曼（1998）一项研究的统计报告显示CEO报酬更大程度上受到公司绩效的驱动。他们发现制造业企业CEO预计95%的报酬绩效敏感性会引起现有认股权津贴价值64%的变化，以及现有存货31%的变化，这表明高管薪酬更大程度上受到公司绩效的驱动。而且，管理者理应获得合理报酬，以便使他们的目标能够与企业目标相一致，管理者也应当被鼓励投资其所任职的企业，以强化其对公司成长和生存的承诺。

结论和建议

这篇论文检测了尼日利亚银行的CEO的总薪酬和公司业绩的关系。论文认为在总的CEO薪酬和公司业绩之间存在显著的正相关关系，同时，所有者权益结构会积极影响银行的市场价值。此外，这项发现显示了高层管理的薪酬独立于大多数研究的银行的业绩。但是，从理论角度来说，论文显示了公司的规模是决定高管薪酬的最重要因素，授予首席执行官的终身职位是另一个重要变量。基于这些发现，我们有必要在更小规模的银行中控制高管薪酬的增长，需要控制高管削减银行利润并保持较少的持有者，从而支持持有双倍股数的股东。除此之外，为了根据会计业绩来分配高管的薪酬，有必要对尼日利亚银行的高管理性对待，因为这些措施和股东利益最大化直接相关。

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