公众观点和死刑废除

原文作者：Vidmar N, Ellsworth P 单位：Stanford Law Review

摘要：立法者经常引用民意调查来捍卫他们对死刑的立场，但是仅仅提到支持或反对死刑的一般水平并不一定会给我们提供判断公众真正想要死刑的信息或者这些要求是否基于宪法可接受的道德标准。相反，我们必须考虑对死刑进行调查，因为它适用于特定类型的犯罪分子，以适用于特定的罪行，并且在特定的情况和条件下适用。此外，我们必须在人们对死刑的认识以及他们持有的其他态度和价值的背景下考虑这些态度。

关键词：死刑；民意；认知态度

引言

在一定程度上，舆论一直是对死刑进行监督的一部分，消极主义者和信奉主义者都在伦理和哲学著作中提及它，立法者经常引用民意调查来捍卫他们对死刑的立场。对于公众在死刑问题上的立场，民意调查是否是关于死刑的公众意见的有效指标以及开明的舆论在多大程度上决定了当代的体面标准，他们表示了尖锐的分歧。这篇文章的目的是通过审查有关这个问题的民意调查和其他社会科学研究来评估公众对死刑的态度。其中一个目标是为立法和司法决策者提供更健全的社会科学基础来评估关于死刑的公众舆论。另一个目标是注意我们对这个问题的认识上的差距，并且为将来在研究中需要提出的那类问题提供框架。

一、公众对死刑的态度

（一）对死刑的一般支持

Erskine列出了从1936年到1969年所有可用的全国性和全州范围内有关死刑的民意调查。绝大多数民意调查只询问了有关谋杀死刑的一般问题。基本上，她的文章中所载的数据表明，公众对死刑的支持下降幅度相当一致。盖洛普民意调查显示，支持率从1936年的62％下降到1966年的42％。然而，在1966年之后，这一趋势逆转，Erskine的评论显示，到1969年盖洛普民意调查显示，51％的美国公众支持死刑。 1969年以后进行的全国性民意调查显示，这种上升趋势得到持续支持，最近的民意调查显示59％的民众支持死刑。

（二）在特定情况下对死刑的支持

大多数民意调查只询问谋杀的死刑或对其的普遍情绪。然而，一些数据，大部分是最近的，提供了关于应该或不应该被处决的人的态度的信息，应该给予死刑的具体情况以及最重要的是强制性死刑。在弗曼诉乔治案件之后，两次民意调查都询问了强制性死刑和受访者赞成强制性死刑的具体犯罪类型。 1973年5月在明尼苏达州的一次民意调查中，询问了四种类型的犯罪是否应该“自动死刑”。百分之四十九的人赞成当杀害执法官时适用死刑，59％的人赞成当绑架者或劫机者杀死一个人时适用死刑，58％的人赞成在暗杀联邦核心人员的情况下适用死刑， 39％的人赞成当犯下叛国罪，破坏罪和间谍罪等针对联邦政府的罪行时适用死刑。

（三）不同阶层人口对死刑的态度

评估不同阶层人口对死刑的支持至关重要。首先，了解某些亚群的特征可能会洞察死刑态度背后的动态，从而产生与道德标准相关的信息。其次，立法和司法决策者有时依靠被推定为“专家”或“知情”的警察，精神病学家或部长等群体的意见，认为这些群体对于死刑威慑力或道德威慑力的质疑。

对Erskine报道的民意调查以及本文所述的其他民意调查进行的检查表明，在民意测验中，死刑态度的人口统计相关性相当一致。然而，请再次注意，大部分数据都是基于对谋杀罪的态度，没有考虑弗曼后限制的态度。一般来说，支持死刑的人往往年龄更大，受教育程度更低，男性更富有。与专业人士和商人相比，白领工人，体力劳动者和农民更喜欢死刑，而绝大多数警察还有共和党人也倾向于支持死刑，而另一方面，大多数精神病医生，神职人员和囚犯倾向于反对死刑。所以说职位不同对死刑的了解还有支持程度是不一样的，而支持死刑的职位，其群体也往往比较庞大，因此，在统计死刑支持率时，支持率往往偏高。

二、支持死刑的表达理由

（一）表示相信死刑威慑力

相信威慑效力可能是支持死刑的最经常评估的理由。 1960年明尼苏达州的民意调查提问：“如果所有州都废除了死刑判决，你是否认为美国的犯罪率会上升，下降，还是不会有什么区别？“18％的人认为会上升，而5％的人认为会下降，73％的人则认为这没有什么区别，1972年2月在得克萨斯举行的一次民意调查中问道：“如果死刑犯实际上被执行了，你认为我们在德克萨斯州的谋杀案会减少吗？”52％的参与人员说会减少，36％说没有，有12％的人表示他们不知道。在1973年爱荷华州民意调查中认为应该恢复死刑的人中，44％认为这是对犯罪的威慑，而23％表示现在的事情太宽松了。爱荷华州民意调查还问到反对恢复死刑的人为什么反对恢复死刑，34％的人表示他们“遭到个人反对”，25％的人认为政府不应该决定生死，17％的人表示这不是一种威慑犯罪，9％说监狱比死亡更糟糕，5％说无辜者有时会因犯罪人员的死亡而死亡。

1973年哈里斯调查对支持死刑的各种常见理由进行了最详细和全面的调查。该调查中的一个问题是询问受访者是否觉得死刑比起无期徒刑有更有效的威慑作用。百分之五十六的受访者表示他们认为这是更有效的，而32％的受访者认为这不是。在死刑的支持者中，76％认为它比无期徒刑更有效，但只有29％的死刑反对者认为它更有效。虽然这一发现表明，相信死刑的威慑效力可能至少部分是对公众支持负责的可能性，但必须考虑一个警告;表达信仰的威慑力量可能被支持者视为支持死刑的社会最可接受的理由，因此可以用作其他不太可接受的理由的掩护。

（二）害怕报复

许多受访者认为威慑并不是支持死刑的最根本原因。在一个问题中，受访者被问到：“如果你认为死刑并不比长期徒刑更有效，以防止其他人犯下杀人等犯罪行为，你是否会赞成死刑还是你会反对的？”百分之五十四的赞成死刑的人表示，即使它没有威慑作用，他们也会支持死刑。哈里斯调查还向受访者提供了支持死刑的理由清单，并要求他们指出每个理由在多大程度上反映了他们自己的观点.虽然大多数受访者表示他们认为死刑是有效的威慑或认可其他与威慑有关的原因，约40％的样本支持“圣经报应”的理由。因此，评估人们赞成死刑的理由的这些不同方式产生的数据表明，害怕报复可能是死刑活动中的一个重要动机。虽然这些数据本身并不能让我们正确比较报复与威慑理由对于支持死刑的相对重要性，但是可以看出人们有时候支持死刑并不是怕犯罪本身带来的损害结果，而是怕一些后续影响。

三、公众对死刑的认知程度

公众对死刑事实认识的信息对于评估对死刑的支持是否基于“知情”意见至关重要。在弗曼，马歇尔法官提出了两个的断言。第一个断言是，公众对死刑不了解；第二个断言是，如果公众了解其目的和责任，大多数人会反对死刑。

（一）公众对死刑的认识

精神病学家路易斯·戈德金对约50人进行了非正式访谈，询问他们对死刑问题的感受和了解程度，从这些访谈中可以得出结论。美国人似乎对这个问题的概念有限，对这个问题的看法很少，并没有花太多时间以客观的方式来思考。大多数人都接受传统意义上的想法，而没有对其重要性进行明智的评估。其他研究结果表明，舆论往往直接通过政治家或其他公众人物的行动和声明形成。因此，从这些角度来看，人们对死刑不了解，而且他们对死刑的支持至少部分基于传统，不加批判地接受关于其威慑效果的假设，或者对政治领导人的认可，

（二）对死刑的认识和态度

最直接，最恰当的方法来检验经验的有效性马歇尔法官的第二个主张是创造一种实验情境，随机选择的一群人暴露于与死刑的所有功利主义，人道主义和道德问题有关的所有相关论点。然后可以将该实验对照组中人员的暴露后死亡处罚与他们的暴露前态度或与未接受治疗的可比较群体的态度进行比较。虽然经济成本和其他可行性问题必然要求研究仅限于相对较少的人群，但研究的极其重要的优势是由于我们可以确定人们对这些问题充分了解。因此，他们的态度是否基于“知情”意见是毫无疑问的。这样的研究将提供有关死刑是否与当代正派标准不一致的最佳信息。

四、总结

民意调查可以有助于评估社区的态度，并可以为立法和司法决策者提供其他有用的信息，但是它们的正确使用需要比以往更先进的研究和对研究的更复杂的解释。尽管过去十年民意调查所反映的死刑越来越多，但有证据表明，有一些对死刑的支持可能源于与当代立法和司法目标不一致的动机。有些人可能主要为报复动机而支持死刑;此外，死刑的支持者比反对者更可能支持支持偏见和歧视的态度陈述，暴力作为实现社会目标的手段和限制公民自由。总之，支持死刑的人员大多对案件本质没有深刻的认知，没有考虑罪刑相适应原则。所以在实际适用死刑时，民意只能作为一定的影响因素，而不是绝对因素。

外文文献出处：http://www.jstor.org/

附外文文献原文：

Public Opinion and the Death Penalty

Neil Vidmart

Phoebe Ellswortht

In Furman v. Georgial the United States Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 per decision, held that the death penalty as then administered violated the eighth amendment prohibition of 'cruel and unusual' punishment Justices Brennan and Marshall would have held that the death penalty was cruel and unusual per se, but Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White based their concurring decisions on limited grounds that the death penalty was unconstitutional because it was applied in a sporadic, capricious, arbitrary, or unfairly discriminatory way.2 Thus, although the Furman decision effectively voided the death sentences of 631 persons on death row in 32 states,3 it left open the possibility that capital punishment would be acceptable if its inequities and arbitrary application were corrected. Such an 'equitable' capital punishment law would eliminate discretion in sentencing by making the death penalty mandatory for all persons convicted of capital crimes or would severely limit discretion by providing strict standards specifying the conditions under which the death penalty must or must not be imposed.4 Since Furman, many states have enacted legislation aimed at restoring the death penalty in conformity with these criteria, two have reinstated it by judicial review,5 and legislation is pending in a number of other legislatures, including Congress. As of March 15, 1974, there were already 72 persons awaiting execution on death rows in various states.6 Future litigation on the death penalty seems assured and it may well involve the question of whether capital punishment per se constitutes 'cruel and unusual' punishment.^[1]

To some extent public opinion has always played a part in conversation about the death penalty. Now, however, it appears that public opinion may assume a role of particular importance in judicial decision making. Unlike many Co

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Public Opinion and the Death Penalty

Neil Vidmart

Phoebe Ellswortht

In Furman v. Georgial the United States Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 per decision, held that the death penalty as then administered violated the eighth amendment prohibition of 'cruel and unusual' punishment Justices Brennan and Marshall would have held that the death penalty was cruel and unusual per se, but Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White based their concurring decisions on limited grounds that the death penalty was unconstitutional because it was applied in a sporadic, capricious, arbitrary, or unfairly discriminatory way.2 Thus, although the Furman decision effectively voided the death sentences of 631 persons on death row in 32 states,3 it left open the possibility that capital punishment would be acceptable if its inequities and arbitrary application were corrected. Such an 'equitable' capital punishment law would eliminate discretion in sentencing by making the death penalty mandatory for all persons convicted of capital crimes or would severely limit discretion by providing strict standards specifying the conditions under which the death penalty must or must not be imposed.4 Since Furman, many states have enacted legislation aimed at restoring the death penalty in conformity with these criteria, two have reinstated it by judicial review,5 and legislation is pending in a number of other legislatures, including Congress. As of March 15, 1974, there were already 72 persons awaiting execution on death rows in various states.6 Future litigation on the death penalty seems assured and it may well involve the question of whether capital punishment per se constitutes 'cruel and unusual' punishment.^[1]

To some extent public opinion has always played a part in conversation about the death penalty. Now, however, it appears that public opinion may assume a role of particular importance in judicial decision making. Unlike many Constitutional issues, the meaning of the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment appears to have been extended such that the purview of legal review includes a direct assessment of the values of society at large. In the leading case of Weems v. United States,^[2][3][4][5] the Supreme Court rejected a static interpretation of the eighth amendment; rather, it recognized that 'Time . brings into existence new conditions and purposes,' and the interpretation of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment may change as 'public opinion becomes enlightened by a human justice.' Later, in Trop v. the Court refer this position when it asserted that the eighth amendment derived its meaning from 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' Throughout Furman, both concurring and dissenting Justices accepted these precedents.^[6]They expressed sharp disagreement, however, on the questions of where the public stands on the issue of capital punishment, whether opinion polls are valid indicators of public sentiment about capital punishment, and the extent to which enlightened public opinion determines contemporary standards of decency.

The purpose of this Article is to assess public attitudes toward capital punishment by examining public opinion polls and other social science studies bearing on this issue. One goal is to provide legislative and judicial decisionmakers with a sounder social science base for evaluating public opinion about the death penalty. Another goal is to note the gaps in our knowledge of this subject, and to frame the sort of questions that need to be asked in future research.

The major thesis of the Article is that merely noting general levels of support for or against capital punishment will not necessarily give us the kind of information needed to judge what the public really wants with regard to the death penalty or whether those wants are based on constitutionally acceptable standards of morality. Rather, we must consider attitudes toward capital punishment as it is to be applied to specific types of criminals for specific crimes and under specific circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, we must consider these attitudes in the context of peoples knowledge about capital punishment and in the context of other attitudes and values that they hold.

I. THE CONTEXT FOR EVALUATING OPINION POLL FINDINGs

Before reviewing the existing research on attitudes toward the death penalty, we should first discuss a number of considerations that are useful in evaluating the findings of public opinion polls and in deciding the extent to which findings of such polls should be used as a standard for determining whether the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment.

First, the Furman decision clearly prohibited discretionary application of the death penalty. If the public should favor capital punishment only in a form that would result in arbitrary imposition of death sentences, these views would be judicially unacceptable. The important question, then, is whether people favor 'non-discretionary' death sentences for certain crimes, and if so, under what conditions.

A second possible criterion was raised by Justice Marshall in his Furman concurrence. He asserted that the law should be guided only by 'informed' public opinion. It is not possible to determine whether capital punishment as it actually functions offends a persons sense of decency if that person is ignorant or misinformed about capital punishment. For example, a person who favors the death penalty because he assumes it deters crime, involves low cost to society, and e

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