实现食品安全监管的最佳规则

原文作者Diana Crumley 单位 德克萨斯州大学法学院

摘要：经济学家经常强调三种影响食品安全的因素：市场力量、法律法规和产品责任法律。例如，如果食品生产者销售掺假食品，它可能会失去声誉，从而影响市场份额和销售收入，这是市场力量的影响；也可能会因为食品安全法受到罚款、产品召回以及临时或永久性工厂关闭；如果被起诉，它需要支付原告的经济损失、诉讼费以及惩罚性赔偿。尽管食品生产者受到市场力量的支配和产品责任法的约束，本文主要关注食品安全法对食品安全的影响。

关键词：食品安全；法律法规；执法

法律和法规是影响食品安全最强烈的因素。因为消费者很少有能力来确定哪种因素使他们生病或哪个食品生产商对他们的损害负责，他们很少有资源去调查类似食源性疾病病例。这些情况下就使得公共执法在食品安全方面特别适用。

“旨在通过执行标准处理食品安全的法规”应包括以下内容：（1）针对污染物存在的可量化和可测量的执行标准；（2）监测对执行标准的遵守情况的可靠检查程序；（3）未遵守绩效标准的经济惩罚。本文着重于经济惩罚，并考虑到检查程序的检查频率。虽然法律法规非常重要，但是如果没有执法，结构合理的法律或法规不会产生威慑力。执法是使法律或法规成为负面激励的原因，它激励企业遵守规则，以免受到惩罚或引起政府监管机构的注意。执法机关的问题是如何执法来使社会福利最大化——通过确定罚款水平，并选择强制执行责任标准。

1.执法支出：合规还是威慑？

政策制定者对政府执法理论应该采用哪种存在分歧：基于威慑的执法和基于合规的执法。赞成合规执法的人认为，公司希望遵守并将最好地对一个支持性的合作监管机构做出回应。该理论强调确保遵守规则而不是制裁不法行为。处罚被视为威胁而不是制裁，如果达成一致，制裁通常会被撤回。赞成威慑执法的人认为，那些经营的企业有社会责任感，受到市场力量的激励，并有自己的内部监管体系，以确保一定程度上符合法律和法规。以威慑为基础的强制执行，也是经济学家更喜欢的强制执行类型。假设企业只在违规成本超过违规收益的情况下遵守，与基于合规的强制执行相比，大量的评估处罚，执法行动和检查是可取的。不合规的好处包括由于不采取某些安全措施而节省的资金，不合规的成本包括实施这些安全措施的成本，加上因违规而被施加的额外处罚，乘以将检测违规的概率。因此，执法机构的任务是使处罚足够高，发现的可能性足够大，使违反法律在经济上不合理。

2.设置精细

为了起到威慑作用，必须执行惩罚措施。金斯堡大法官说得好：威胁除非可信地执行，否则没有威慑力。食品制造者不一定会因存在补救措施而受到劝阻，但是一旦被起诉并大量赔偿，在再次违法之前肯定会三思而后行。

这种关系在环境管理领域已有详细记录，对这种关系的观察很容易转移到食品安全法领域。例如，经济学家Jay Shimshack和Michael Ward发现，制裁不仅在个人层面而且在整个行业范围内都有阻止污染的作用。他们发现纸浆和造纸厂，特别是那些随机排放的纸浆厂，以增加民事惩罚为基础，通过减少全面排放，即使个别公司不受制裁时也是如此。“罚款产生的违规率惊人地大幅下降，大约减少了三分之二并且导致不合格的工厂变得合格。”在某些情况下，这种效应导致随机排放的企业出现过度依从，因为它们的违规风险较高。当然，对食品设施征收的罚款可能与环境污染罚款背景不同。与纸浆和造纸厂排放的污染相比，这不会影响纸张的整体质量，食品安全反映了所提供产品的质量。如果被污染的产品可以追溯到违规企业，市场力量和产品责任法律可以作为额外的威慑力量。

特定食品安全违规造成的危害往往是不确定的。违反食品安全的行为，例如不当制冷或啮齿动物感染等都会导致食源性疾病。因此，由于检查违规而评估的处罚与食品一旦造成伤害时评估的处罚不同。检验水平的危害计算将涉及两个不确定的数字：给定的食品安全违规可能导致的损害，如食品疾病的成本。如果产品因违规而受到污染以及鉴于违规行为，计算实际发生伤害的可能性。然而，一旦该机构发现由于食源性疾病爆发而导致的违规产品，伤害计算仅仅是数据收集问题，因为该行为已经造成了伤害，并且该机构可以计算违规造成的实际损害。因此，干预阶段改变了为计算惩罚考虑的变量；“基于行为的制裁”包含了预期的损害，而“基于伤害的制裁”则包含了实际损害。FDCA规定了基于危害和基于行为的制裁，并在“可能对健康造成伤害”的条件下惩罚食品制造者。

贝克尔的最优惩罚通常被称为“乘数原理”。由于政府无法检测和惩罚所有违规行为，因此必须以其发现概率来衡量对社会的危害。如果食品机构的违规行为有四分之一的机会被相关执法机构发现，最优惩罚等于伤害乘以四。换句话说，一种导致100万美元损失的食品安全事故将有400万美元的罚款。用较高的罚款来弥补较低的检查费用。相比之下，当法规限制可以评估的罚金金额时，更高的检查概率必须补偿较低的处罚。

这种最优惩罚集中于社会福利的最大化。它没有优先考虑违规的私人成本和收益，尽管它们与个人是否会参与特定的有害行为有关。相反，这种最佳惩罚措施强调了造成伤害或有可能造成伤害的行为的社会影响。由于该机构在罚款时承担费用，并且由于政府在施加此类处罚时（无论是在司法还是行政环境中）欠公民的正当处理权利，Polinsky和Shavell的最终表述将这些现实世界的担忧考虑在内。

传统的乘数原理有几个缺点。首先，必须根据具体情况计算罚金，作为最佳威慑力量。这一计算不仅包括发现概率，还包括实际损害和预期损害。其次，乘数原则仅适用于受监管机构风险中性的情况；否则，大额罚款可能会过度威慑那些低估风险的人。第三，由于该原则基于社会福利的最大化，所以传统乘数原则的应用可能不是公平的或理想的。第四，传统的乘数原则可能会产生如此大的惩罚，以至于违法者将采取不良的高成本的避税行为，从而降低被罚款的可能性。最后，在具有上限惩罚的法定方案中，乘数原则只是一种最佳威慑，直到最优惩罚计算达到最大值。

除评估处罚和完成检查之外的执法因素会促使合规。1988年，温斯顿哈灵顿分析了许多经济学家现在所称的“哈灵顿悖论”。他指出，尽管监督和惩罚评估程度较低，但受空气和水污染条例管制的企业仍被认为符合大部分的时间。哈灵顿将这种悖论与博弈论结合起来，他指出大多数早期执法文献都包含一个静态模型，因为机构和企业无法对彼此的行为做出反应。但是在现实世界中，该机构可以根据公司过去的表现来改变预期的惩罚和检查频率。公司为了避免被归类为值得进一步检查或更严厉执法措施的公司而严格遵守法规。例如，由FDA监管的公司将遵守避免高风险分类的规定，优先审查这些分类，或为避免OAI分类而采取执法行动。这种行为表明受监管公司的风险规避水平有所提高。

3.选择责任计划

根据对生产者施加的责任标准，处罚也将具有不同的威慑价值。执法文献侧重于责任方案的两个因素：它们如何影响市场参与者的行为以及它们如何影响执法活动。在1980年的一篇论文中，Shavell比较了严格的责任和过失计划，他认为严格责任计划往往效率更高，因为它们会影响违规者的活动水平。在卖家和客户之间的“市场案例”中，产品销售的风险，严格责任的生产者选择社会最优的关怀水平，以最大限度地降低生产成本和事故损失。因此，严格责任使市场更接近社会最优产出，其中边际社会生产成本等于边际私人生产成本加边际外部成本。

基于过错责任和严格责任制度之间的差异也对执法产生影响。首先，基于过错的赔偿责任会导致更多不同的执行成本，因为监管机构或法院将不得不确定适当的标准以及何时该公司能达到该标准。相反，严格责任只要求执法者确定损害并确保公司对该损害承担一定的最低责任。其次，使用基于过错的责任制将降低违规数量，因此需要“更高的制裁”，这将允许“采用相对较低的检测概率”。

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附外文文献原文

ACHIEVING OPTIMAL DETERRENCE IN FOODSAFETY REGULATION

C. Laws amp; Regulation

Laws and regulations are the strongest negative incentives affecting food producersrsquo; level of foodsafety Public enforcement of laws is justified “when victims do not know who injured them” and “when identifying . . . violators is difficult.” It is especially useful when “private parties may find it hard to capture fully the benefits of developing expensive, but socially worthwhile information systems.” Consumers rarely have the knowledge to pinpoint what item made them sick or which food producer was responsible for that contamination, and they rarely have the resources to investigate similar cases of foodborne illness. These circumstances make public enforcement particularly appropriate in the foodsafety context.

“Regulations designed to address foodsafety through performance standards” should include the following: “(a) a quantifiable and measurable performance standard for the presence of contaminants, (b) a reliable inspection procedure for monitoring compliance to the performance standard, and (c) an economic penalty for failure to comply with the performance standard.” This paper focuses on (c), the economic penalty, with some consideration of the frequency of inspection employed in (b). While the substance of laws and regulations is undoubtedly important, a well-structured law or regulation has no deterrent impact without enforcement. Enforcement is what makes the law or regulation a negative incentive, in that it incentivizes firms to follow the rules lest they be punished or otherwise attract attention from government inspectors and regulators. The “enforcement authorityrsquo;s problem” is to “maximize social welfare” by choosing how to expend enforcement expenditures, by determining the “level of the fine,” and by selecting the “standard for imposing liability.”

ACHIEVING OPTIMAL DETERRENCE IN FOODSAFETY REGULATION

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C. Laws amp; Regulation

Laws and regulations are the strongest negative incentives affecting food producersrsquo; level of foodsafety Public enforcement of laws is justified “when victims do not know who injured them” and “when identifying . . . violators is difficult.” It is especially useful when “private parties may find it hard to capture fully the benefits of developing expensive, but socially worthwhile information systems.” Consumers rarely have the knowledge to pinpoint what item made them sick or which food producer was responsible for that contamination, and they rarely have the resources to investigate similar cases of foodborne illness. These circumstances make public enforcement particularly appropriate in the foodsafety context.

“Regulations designed to address foodsafety through performance standards” should include the following: “(a) a quantifiable and measurable performance standard for the presence of contaminants, (b) a reliable inspection procedure for monitoring compliance to the performance standard, and (c) an economic penalty for failure to comply with the performance standard.” This paper focuses on (c), the economic penalty, with some consideration of the frequency of inspection employed in (b). While the substance of laws and regulations is undoubtedly important, a well-structured law or regulation has no deterrent impact without enforcement. Enforcement is what makes the law or regulation a negative incentive, in that it incentivizes firms to follow the rules lest they be punished or otherwise attract attention from government inspectors and regulators. The “enforcement authorityrsquo;s problem” is to “maximize social welfare” by choosing how to expend enforcement expenditures, by determining the “level of the fine,” and by selecting the “standard for imposing liability.”

1. Enforcement Expenditures: Compliance or Deterrence?

Policymakers differ on what theory of enforcement government should adopt. The conflict is often between two modes of enforcement: deterrence-based enforcement and compliance-based enforcement. Those in favor of compliance-based enforcement believe that corporations want to comply and will respond best to a supportive, cooperative regulator. The model “emphasizes securing compliance rather than sanctioning wrongdoing. Penalties are seen as threats rather than sanctions, and sanctions are typically withdrawn if compliance is achieved.” Those in favor of the cooperation model argue that those running corporations have a sense of social responsibility, are motivated by market forces to comply, and have their own internal regulatory systems that ensure some level of compliance with laws and regulation.

Deterrence-based enforcement, the type of enforcement more favored by economists, assumes that businesses comply only “where the costs of noncompliance outweigh the benefits of noncompliance.” In contrast to compliance-based enforcement, a larger number of assessed penalties, enforcement actions, and inspections is preferable. The benefits of noncompliance include the money saved by not adopting certain safety measures, and the costs of noncompliance include the cost of implementing those safety measures, “plus any additional penalties imposed for being found in violation, all multiplied (discounted) by the probability that the violations will be detected.” Therefore, “the task for enforcement agencies is to make penalties high enough and the probability of detection great enough that it becomes economically irrational for facilities to violate . . . the regulationrsquo;s requirements.”

2. Setting the Fine

In order to be a deterrent, a penalty must be enforced. Justice Ginsburg may have put it best: A threat has no deterrent value unless it is credible that it will be carried out. It would-be polluter may or may not be dissuaded by the existence of a remedy on the books, but a defendant once hit in its pocketbook will surely think twice before polluting again.

This relationship has been well documented in the field of environmental regulation, and observations about this relationship can easily be transferred to the field of foodsafety law. For example, economists Jay Shimshack and Michael Ward found that sanctions deter pollution not just at the individual level, but industry-wide. They have found that pulp and paper plants, especially those that emit stochastically, react to increased civil-penalty-based enforcement by reducing discharges across the board--even when the individual firm was not subjec

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