论文总字数：24477字

摘 要

随着我国经济体制改革的进一步深化,在网络银行快速发展的背景下，传统银行业如何在备受冲击的背景下继续稳步发展已经成为一家银行股东考虑的关键问题。自金融危机爆发以来,一直上升的高管薪酬不仅创造了关于薪酬的神话,而且还引起了一些公众和一些国家的质疑。中国也正在追随全球限制工资浪潮的步伐。金融高管的薪酬是否过高?这会否会造成严重的道德风险?高管的高薪对金融企业的整体业绩能否起到不可缺少的作用？

现如今，中国的国有控股上市银行已逐步引入了基本工资还有银行业绩作关联的奖励措施，只是目前工资奖励造成的影响还不清晰。此外，银行的工资构成方式还是较少的，而且大部分是短期的资金奖励，并不重视长期的薪酬激励，对银行业的可持续发展并不理想。

金融类银行类企业应如何审查自己的薪酬和激励制度，编写标准化的内部奖励方法，最大可能减少企业内部高管和银行所有者两者的资金往来不必要的消耗，完成更多的利益目标。根据大量国内还有国外资料的参考，本篇主要按照沪市每年财务具体详细数据，然后利用线性回归的方法研究了高管薪酬还有银行业绩构成两者的关联，以此考察高管薪酬和国有控股商业银行具体业绩是否存在某种联系。

研究的结果显示，我国国有控股商业银行里，高管薪酬还有银行业绩两者不存在显眼的正向关系，和银行的整体模块构成也不存在显眼的正向关系，和企业资本集中的具体规模K有负向关系,与公司董事会的独立性也没有显著的正向关系,与公司监事会规模也呈现较弱正向关系。基于研究和实证的结果,本文建议我们提出一种方法,在国有控股商业银行企业高管职工薪酬考核管理中加强应用的解决对策,以此为基础来进一步提高商业银行的综合竞争力。

关键词:商业银行；高管薪酬；企业绩效；影响

A study of the impact of executive compensation on firm performance

Based on data from Chinese state-controlled commercial banks

Abstract

With the deepening of financial reform and the huge impact on the profits of traditional banking industry under the influence of Internet finance, how to improve the profitability of banks and how to stand out from the competition has become a key issue for bank shareholders to consider. Executive compensation, which has been rising since the onset of the financial crisis, has not only created myths about pay, but has also raised questions from some members of the public and some countries. China is also following the global wave of wage restraint. Are financial executives being paid too much? Could this create a serious moral hazard? Can the high salaries of executives play a crucial role in the overall performance of financial firms?

At present, although China's state-owned listed banks have initially established a pay incentive mechanism combining basic salary and bank performance, the effect of pay incentive is not obvious. Moreover, there are relatively not many forms of remuneration in banks, and most of them are in the short-term incentive of paying attention to cash, while the disregard or absence of long-term incentive mechanisms, such as restricted shares and share options, can also negatively affect the long-term development of banks.

How should financial banking-type companies review their own compensation and incentive systems and develop sound internal incentive and disincentive mechanisms to minimize the transaction costs between executives and owners and maximize profits. Based on comprehensive domestic and international literature, this paper analyzes the relationship between executive compensation and bank performance using linear regressions based on their annual financial data in Shanghai, using four state-owned listed banks to explore the relationship between executive compensation and overall performance of state-owned listed banks.

The empirical analysis shows that executive compensation of state-owned listed banks is not significantly and positively related to overall bank performance, nor is it significantly and positively related to bank size, negatively related to equity concentration K, not significantly related to board independence, and weakly and positively related to supervisory board size. Based on the empirical results, this paper proposes applied countermeasures to strengthen executive compensation management in state-controlled banks as a way to further improve the overall bank performance.

Keywords: Commercial banks; Executive compensation; Enterprise performance; influence

目 录

摘 要 II

Abstract III

第一章 绪 论 5

1.1研究背景 5

1.2研究目的及意义 5

1.3研究内容及方法 5

1.4论文框架 6

第二章 高管薪酬激励基础理论 7

2.1概念界定 7

2.1.1银行高管 7

2.1.2高管薪酬 7

2.1.3公司业绩 7

2.2 高管薪酬和银行绩效相关理论 8

2.2.1激励理论 8

2.2.2利益关联者理论 8

2.2.3委托代理理论 8

2.3文献综述 9

2.3.1高管薪酬的影响因素 9

2.3.2高管薪酬与企业绩效关系研究 9

2.3.3文献评述 10

第三章 国有控股上市银行高管薪酬现状分析 11

3.1整体状况描述 11

3.2现有薪酬体系构成 12

3.3 我国国有控股银行高管薪酬特征分析 13

3.3.1国有控股上市银行高管管理人员薪酬结构单一 13

3.3.2国有控股上市银行高管缺乏激励 14

第四章 国有控股上市银行高管薪酬与银行业绩关系模型构建 15

4.1变量选取 15

4.2研究假设 16

4.3模型构建 17

第五章 实证分析 18

5.1描述性统计 18

5.1.1数据分析 18

5.2假设检验 19

5.3结果分析 19

结 论 21

参考文献 23

致 谢 26

第一章 绪 论

1.1研究背景

2016年,国有银行年报被正式公布,银行业高管的薪酬大幅提升成为了历史。2015年,国有银行对高管的薪资待遇下调至100万元以下,只有企业的中高级管理者薪资待遇仍维持在相等的水平。根据中国工商银行、中国建设银行、中国银行的年报,三大国有银行之间的年薪从2014年起就开始继续减少。然而,年报数据还显示,工商银行和中国建设银行的每个月平均收入净利润分别为13.85亿元,但是每个月的净利润增加速度却很低,这是一份非常让人失望的答卷。

虽然由于政府对银行业中高管人才薪酬的直接约束性限制和金融机构监管力度的加大,这导致了上市银行的中小企业高管人才薪酬在很长一段时期内都是呈现出下降的趋势,但是根据一些相关的统计数据,大多数股份制银行的中小企业高管人才薪酬仍然是处于比较高的位置,而且国有银行中的高管人才薪酬则是处于比较低的位置。那么,在工资上限令下,商业银行高管的薪酬与他们的业绩之间到底有没有存在一定的联系?银行对高管的激励机制是不是仍然有效?在这种薪酬结构下,银行的业绩有没有朝同一方向发展上升,高管薪酬的调整是否真的影响了对商业银行的业绩?这个问题值得我们去探讨和研究。

1.2研究目的及意义

（1）理论意义

剩余内容已隐藏，请支付后下载全文，论文总字数：24477字