论文总字数：24126字

摘 要

近年来，互联网技术的进步、投融资观念的改变，我国的民间金融得到了快速发展，也促进了我国互联网金融的进步。互联网金融作为一个将传统的金融机构与互联网技术相结合的新兴领域，能够为消费者提供资金融通、投资、在线支付，以及信息中介等服务。而众筹融资是互联网金融的代表模式，为中小企业提供项目融资，使得一些有前景的项目成功地实施、推广的同时，也为大众创造了新的投资机会，在金融市场上发挥着重要作用。

众筹融资为人们提供便利的同时，也存在一些亟待解决的问题。众筹的参与者将如何决定他们的行为？众筹存在何种激励促使互不相识的人共同参与？本文应用博弈论等方法，对众筹平台、筹资者和投资者的行为决策和激励相容性进行分析，并提出相应的激励机制。同时，对众筹参与者提出建议，促进众筹融资的规范化发展，使其能够更好的为我国经济的发展提供助力。

具体而言，本文研究了众筹平台的竞争行为以及众筹投资者与筹资者之间的博弈。研究发现：众筹平台提供的服务（以空间成本作为代表）对筹资者的吸引力越大，则众筹平台的利润越高；众筹平台存在网络外部性，平台的网络外部性越强，平台所占有的市场份额越大；众筹中投资者和筹资者都追求自身效用最大化，当众筹筹资者的伪装成本较高时，投资者投资会倾向于投资众筹项目；而当投资者预期项目成功可获得收益较高，筹资者会倾向于不努力完成项目。此外，本文研究显示众筹参与者的激励相容，当参与众筹的投资者的数量越大，众筹参与者的效用就越大。众筹信息披露和反馈机制、项目筛选机制，以及阀值机制能够帮助提高众筹项目质量，增加参与众筹的筹资者和投资者数量。

关键词：众筹参与者 行为决策 激励相容 激励机制

Research on Decision-making and Incentives Mechanism of the Crowdfunding Participants

Abstract

In recent years, with the development of Internet technology and the concept of investment and financing, our country’s private finance and Internet finance develop rapidly. As a combine of traditional financial field and Internet technology, Internet finance provides services such as investment, online payment and information intermediary for consumers. The crowdfunding is a representative model of Internet finance. The crowdfunding provide financing opportunity for small and medium enterprises and create new investment opportunity for the public, making some promising projects successful. Therefore, crowdfunding has played an important role in the finance market.

However, there are lots of problems about crowdfunding have not been resolved. How crowdfunding participants determine their behavior? What are the incentives of crowdfunding? This article use game theory and other methods to analysis the decision-making behavior and incentives mechanism of the crowdfunding platforms, investors and fund-raisers. Meanwhile, this paper makes recommendations for crowdfunding participants to promote the development of crowdfunding.

Specifically, this paper studies the competitive behavior of crowdfunding platforms and the game between crowdfunding investors and fund-raisers. It is shown that the larger attraction of the crowdfunding platforms service for fund-raisers (space costs as a representative) is, the higher profit of platforms is. Also, crowdfunding platforms have network externalities, the stronger network externalities are, the larger market share for platforms is. Furthermore, crowdfunding investors and fund-raisers are in pursuit of maximizing their own utility. When the camouflage costs of fund-raisers are high, investors will tend to invest in crowdfunding projects; when investors expect the success of the project can obtain higher returns, the fund-raisers tend to work hard to complete the project. In addition, the paper argues that incentives of crowdfunding participants are compatible. When the number of investors is higher, the crowdfunding participants will achieve more utility. Using the information disclosure and feedback mechanism, project selection mechanism and threshold mechanism can help to improve the quality of project and the number of investors and fund-raisers.

Key Words: Crowdfunding participant; Decision-making mechanism; Incentive compatibility; Incentives mechanism

目 录

摘 要 I

Abstract II

第一章 绪论 1

1.1选题背景 1

1.2研究意义与目的 2

1.2.1研究意义 2

1.2.2研究目的 2

1.3研究方法与研究内容 3

1.3.1研究方法 3

1.3.2研究内容 3

1.4创新及不足 3

第二章 国内外研究文献综述 5

2.1众筹的相关定义研究 5

2.1.1定义 5

2.1.2模式 6

2.1.3风险问题 6

2.1.4众筹项目成功因素 8

2.2众筹参与者相关研究 8

2.2.1众筹参与者行为决策 8

2.2.2众筹参与者动机 9

2.3本章小结 10

第三章 众筹参与者行为分析 11

3.1众筹平台竞争行为分析 11

3.1.1模型假设和模型构建 11

3.1.2模型推导 11

3.1.3均衡结果分析 12

3.2创业者与投资者博弈分析 13

3.2.1模型假设和模型构建 14

3.2.2模型推导 14

3.2.3均衡结果分析 15

3.3本章小结 16

第四章 众筹参与者激励机制研究 17

4.1众筹参与者异质性融资激励 17

4.1.1投资者激励 17

4.1.2创业者激励 17

4.1.3众筹平台激励 18

4.1.4众筹参与者激励相容性研究 18

4.2众筹激励机制设计 19

4.2.1阀值机制 20

4.2.2信息披露和反馈机制 20

4.2.3项目筛选机制 21

4.3本章小结 21

第五章 启示与建议 22

5.1对众筹平台的建议 22

5.2对投资者的建议 22

5.3对筹资者的建议 23

参考文献 24

第一章 绪论

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