论文总字数：27499字

摘 要

近年来，随着其他融资途径的限制，以股权质押的形式进行融资开始兴起，由于具有便捷以及高效的特性，受到了市场的欢迎，但因为市场监管部门缺乏有效的监管，其风险一直居高不下，“爆雷”现象成为外部投资者例如银行和券商等金融机构最担心的问题，从最新Wind数据所披露的情况来看，市场质押市值巨大，并有大量股票存在被强制平仓的风险，导致质押过程中出现了很多冲突和问题。

上市公司控股股东通过股权质押方式融资，应该支持企业日常经营活动，将资金充分地流向有利于企业发展的投资项目。而如今其行为却导致很多上市公司市值出现下跌，大量股票在被质押的同时，通常会被强制性的进行平仓，从而引起一系列的连锁反应，导致出现控制权被转移的风险。目前关于该领域的研究文献和资料较少。企业要想长久且稳定的进行发展，必须整合自身资本，并进行合理配置。因此，文中在原有研究的基础上，进行了部分创新，以沪市A股中的上市企业作为研究目标，从上市公司投资效率角度切入，分析公司控股股东将自身股权进行质押的行为会对公司的运营带来怎样的影响。具体从以下几个方面进行考虑：首先，针对控股股东进行该操作的动机进行分析；其次，分析股权质押后给公司带来各类影响，重点关注对投资效率的影响；最后，检验出现非效率投资的具体情况，主要表现为投资过度，还是投资不足。

本文筛选了2014年至2018年沪市主板的上市公司，针对控股股东将自身股权进行质押并获取融资的行为进行分析，并探讨对投资活动的影响。数据结果分析表明，上市公司高比例的股权质押容易造成公司的非效率投资。为了更好的进行研究，文中将整体样本进行了细分，划分为投资不足以及过度这两组，对各组进行分析后可知，以股权质押形式获取的资金并没有得到很好的使用，大部分被用于盲目扩大规模或投资到由股东主导的项目上，造成了投资过度，但是对于投资不足没有发现明显联系。

关键词： 控股股东 股权质押 投资效率

A Study on the Impact of Controlling Shareholders' Equity Pledge on Enterprise Investment Efficiency: A Case Study of A-share Listed Companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange

Abstract

In recent years, with the restriction of other financing channels, financing in the form of equity pledge has begun to rise. Due to its convenient and efficient characteristics, it has been welcomed by the market, its risk has been high The "thunderbolt" phenomenon has become the most worrying problem for external investors such as banks and securities firms. From the latest Wind data, the market pledged market value is huge, and there is a risk of a large number of stocks being forced to close positions. This resulted in many conflicts and problems in the pledge process.

The listed company's controlling shareholder should use equity pledge financing to support the company's daily business activities and fully flow funds to investment projects that are conducive to the development of the enterprise. However, its behavior has led to a decline in the market value of many listed companies. While a large number of stocks are being pledged, they are usually forced to close positions, causing a series of chain reactions and resulting in the risk of control being transferred. At present, there are few research literatures and materials in this field. For an enterprise to develop in a long-term and stable manner, it must integrate its own capital and allocate it reasonably. Therefore, the listed companies in the Shanghai A-share market are taken as research targets to analyze how the controlling shareholder ’s pledge of their own equity will affect the company ’s operations. Specifically, consider the following aspects: Firstly, analyze the motives of the controlling shareholder for this operation; second, analyze the various effects of the equity pledge on the company, focusing on the impact on investment efficiency; finally, examine the specific situation of non-efficient investment， mainly manifested as over-investment or under-investment.

This article screens the listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2018, analyzes the behavior of the controlling shareholder's pledge of their equity and obtains financing, and discusses the impact on investment activities. Analysis of the data results shows that a high percentage of equity pledges of listed companies is likely to cause inefficient investment of the company. In order to better conduct research, the overall sample is subdivided into two groups: underinvestment and excessive. After analysis of each group, it can be seen that the funds obtained in the form of equity pledges have not been used well. Some were used to blindly expand the scale or invest in projects led by shareholders, resulting in overinvestment, but no obvious connection was found for underinvestment.

Keywords : Controlling shareholder; Equity pledge; Investment efficiency

目 录

摘 要 I

Abstract II

目 录 III

第一章 绪 论 1

1.1 研究背景及意义 1

1.1.1 研究背景 1

1.1.2 研究意义 1

1.2 研究思路及方法 1

1.2.1 研究思路 1

1.2.2 研究方法 2

1.3 研究内容及框架 2

第二章 理论基础与文献综述 5

2.1理论基础 5

2.1.1 委托代理理论 5

2.1.2 信息不对称理论 5

2.1.3 超控制权收益理论 6

2.2文献综述 6

2.2.1 控股股东与公司投资行为 6

2.2.2 股权质押相关研究 7

2.2.3 投资效率相关研究 7

2.3研究评述 8

第三章 理论分析与研究假设 9

3.1 控股股东股权质押与投资效率 9

3.2 股权质押与投资不足和投资过度 10

第四章 研究设计与实证结果分析 11

4.1 样本选择与数据来源 11

4.2 模型设计变量定义 11

4.2.1被解释变量 11

4.2.2解释变量 12

4.2.3控制变量 13

4.3 描述性统计与相关性检验 13

4.4 回归结果分析 15

4.4.1假设1的回归结果 15

4.4.2假设2a和2b回归结果 16

4.5 稳健性检验 18

第五章 研究结论与建议 20

5.1 研究结论 20

5.2 政策建议 20

参考文献（References） 21

致谢 22

第一章 绪 论

1.1 研究背景及意义

1.1.1 研究背景

从2016年开始，金融市场出现了较大的变化，杠杆被不断加大，以股权质押为主要方式的新兴融资渠道不断拓宽。但由于融资渠道的便捷性和前期缺乏有效的监管，从2018年开始，相关风险出现大面积的爆发。之后在市场机制的调整下，股权质押市场的整体风险趋于缓和，但是股权质押业务的“爆雷”现象仍然值得我们高度关注。在2019年，根据Wind的数据控制，目前在市场中进行质押的股票数量庞大，已到达了5786亿股，占总体股数的8%左右，因此，必须进行重点关注，避免接下来可能出现的一系列风险。

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