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毕业论文网 > 开题报告 > 管理学类 > 会计学 > 正文

上市公司会计政策变更与盈余管理探究 ——以亚星化学股份有限公司为例开题报告

 2020-04-24 10:19:36  

1. 研究目的与意义(文献综述)

(1)目的

近年来,随着国内整体经济形势的飞速发展,政策推动致使资本融资市场空前繁荣。在我国,上市公司为了获得股票初次发行(ipo)和配股资格,减少纳税,避免被证券监碑管理委员会摘牌,都有可能通过盈余管理达到其目的。

会计政策的变更是最常见也是最原始的盈余管理方法。固定资产折旧方法、存货计价方法、长期投资核算方法、无形资产核算方法、递延资产核算方法、产品开发费用核算方法、养老金核算方法的选用及变更都能对会计收益数额产生一定的影响。尽管会计政策的变更为会计准则所允许,但过度的盈余管理会导致会计信息的失真,成为阻滞金融市场良性发展的重要影响因素。

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2. 研究的基本内容与方案

(1)基本内容及目标

基本内容:

本文以我国上市公司为研究对象,基于盈余管理和会计政策变更的相关理论,借鉴国内外研究现状,在分析上市公司利用会计政策变更进行盈余管理的类型、动机、表现及后果的基础上,进一步剖析上市公司利用会计政策变更进行盈余管理的原因,并结合具体案例分析案例公司利用会计政策变更进行盈余管理的具体情况及产生的后果;最后提出规范上市公司利用会计政策变更进行盈余管理的建议

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3. 研究计划与安排

(1)2017.12.15——2017.12.24 查阅资料,初步选题

(2)2017.12.24——2018.01.15 确定选题

(3)2018.01.15——2018.02.20 完成论文提纲

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4. 参考文献(12篇以上)

[1] gounopoulos, dimitrios, pham, credit ratings and earnings management around ipos. . journal of business finance amp; accounting, 2017, vol. 44:154-195

摘要:this study examines the impact of having a credit rating on earnings management (em) through accruals and real activities manipulation by initial public offering (ipo) firms. we find that firms going public with a credit rating are less likely to engage in income-enhancing accrual-based and real em in the offering year. the monitoring by a credit rating agency (cra) and the reduced information asymmetry due to the provision of a credit rating disincentivise rated issuers from managing earnings. we also suggest that the participation of a reputable auditing firm is crucial for cras to effectively restrain em. moreover, we document that for unrated issuers, at-issue income-increasing em is not linked to future earnings and is negatively related to post-issue long-run stock performance. however, for rated issuers, at-issue income-increasing em is positively associated with subsequent accounting performance and is unrelated to long-run stock performance following the offering. the evidence indicates that managers in unrated firms generally manipulate earnings to mislead investors, while managers in rated firms tend to exercise their accounting and operating discretion for informative purposes.

[2] jean j. chen, haitao zhang, the impact of the corporate governance code on earnings management – evidence from chineselisted companies. european financial management, 2014, vol. 20

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