论文总字数：18300字

摘 要

近年农产品价格高低起伏，不仅增加了农民的种植风险，还限制了消费者的采购能力。本文为农产品的合理销售提供理论依据，探究了使农产品供应链各成员利益达到均衡的条件，丰富了行为经济学理论。

本文以供应链契约理论和行为经济学理论为基础，研究公平关切下的部分价格契约机制问题。主要研究内容包括以下几个方面。

首先，本文从公平关切和供应链价格契约两个方面梳理了国内外相关文献。

其次，研究了决策者为完全理性时的部分价格契约问题，考虑一个由单个农民和单个公司组成的农产品供应链。其中，供应商具有绝对风险规避意识，零售商为完全理性，建立了部分价格契约模型，求得了最优均衡解。研究结果表明，不考虑公平关切下的部分价格契约中，农民的单位种植成本对双方的决策没有影响，但对双方的期望利润有影响，而农民的风险规避因子对双方的决策及期望利润都有影响。

再次，研究了决策者为公平关切时的部分价格契约问题。该供应链中两个成员具有公平关切，建立了部分价格契约模型，并求得了最优均衡解。研究结果表明，考虑公平关切的部分价格契约机制中，部分价格契约能够实现该农产品供应链的协调，此时公司和农民的公平关切度对双方的效用都有一定影响，其中公司的公变关切度对双方的效用更大。并运用仿真法对研究结果进行了验证。

最后，提出了本文的主要研究结论并提出了相应的建议和研究展望。

关键词：完全理性 部分价格契约 公平关切 农产品供应链

A partial price contract mechanism based on fairness concerns

ABSTRACT

The high and low prices of agricultural products in recent years have not only increased the risk of farming for farmers, but also limited the purchasing power of consumers.To provide theoretical basis for the reasonable sales of agricultural products, this paper explores the interests make the agricultural products supply chain members to achieve a balanced condition, enrich the theory of behavioral economics.

Based on the theory of supply chain contract and the theory of behavioral economics, this paper studies some problems of price contract mechanism under fair concern. The main research consists of the following aspects.

Firstly, this paper reviews the relevant documents both at home and abroad from two aspects: fairness concerns and supply chain price contract.

Second, the issue of partial price contracts that decision makers make for full rationality is studied, considering a supply chain consisting of a single farmer and a single company.Among them, the supplier has the absolute risk aversion consciousness, the retailer is completely rational, establishes the partial price contract model, obtains the optimal equilibrium solution.Research results show that regardless of the fairness in the part of the contract price under the concern, the farmers' has no effect on both sides of the decision-making unit planting costs, but have an effect on both sides of the expected profit, and the farmers' risk factor for both decision-making and expected profits.

Thirdly, the issue of partial price contracts for policy-makers as a matter of fairness concerns.The two members of the supply chain have fair concern, establish a partial price contract model, and obtain the optimal equilibrium solution.

Research results show that considering fairness concerns of a part of the contract price mechanism, part of the contract price can achieve the agricultural products supply chain coordination, at this time fair GuanQieDu on both sides of the utility companies and farmers have a certain influence, which the company public variable GuanQieDu more utility for both sides. Than the results are verified by simulation method.

Finally, this paper puts forward the main research conclusions of this paper and puts forward some Suggestions and research prospect.

Key words:fully rational partial; price contract; fairness concerns; agricultural supply chain

目 录

摘要 I

ABSTRACT II

第一章 绪论 1

1.1研究背景 1

1.2研究意义 2

1.2.1理论意义 2

1.2.2实践意义 2

1.3研究目的 3

1.4全文结构框架 3

第二章 文献综述 4

2.1公平关切方面的研究 4

2.2供应链价格契约方面的研究 5

第三章 完全理性下的部分价格契约机制 7

3.1问题描述 7

3.2模型构建 7

3.3模型求解 8

3.4数值分析 9

3.4.1农作物的单位种植成本c对保障价格的影响 9

3.4.2农民的风险规避因子对农民和公司期望利润的影响 11

3.5小结 13

第四章 基于公平关切的部分价格契约机制 14

4.1基本模型 14

4.2模型求解 15

4.3数值分析 16

4.3.1 农民和公司的公平关切度对双方最优决策的影响 16

4.3.2 农民和公司的公平关切度对双方效用的影响 18

第五章 总结与展望 21

5.1总结 21

5.2研究展望 21

参考文献 22

致谢 25

第一章 绪论

1.1研究背景

农产品市场的价格经历了多次大起大落，农产品的价格波动使社会经济中出现价贵伤民,价贱伤农的现象,极大地限制了消费者的采购自由。形成这些现象的原因除了种植成本不稳定、消费者消费观念的转变、通货膨胀以及农民的养殖规模难以扩大以外，缺乏合理的农产品价格的保障机制也是不容忽视的原因。

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