论文总字数：31359字

摘 要

当前我国新型城镇化举措将拉动数十万亿的基础设施投资，如何拓宽融资渠道，以满足基础设施建设所需的大量资金？一种PPP(Private-Public-Partnership)模式正被提出并发展成为政府解决资金短缺的主要途径，但由于生产的产品通常为纯公共品或准公共品，往往使得项目未来收益很难补偿私人巨额的初始投资。，所以，政府给与私人适当补偿就成为PPP项目持续、有效运行的关键。

对于PPP项目的政府补偿问题，学者们当前主要基于事前或事后角度进行相关研究。然而，事前补偿很可能由于补偿过高或不足而导致项目社会福利或私人利益受损，但只有事后补偿又往往会降低私人事前投资的积极性而导致补偿无效性。为此，基于政府对PPP项目补偿决策的困境，引入一种单期补偿契约。而且，考虑到私人投资者在政府补偿下会存在过度自信行为，通过“均值-方差”描述而引入私人过度自信系数，建立私人投资的期望效用函数。进而，运用主从博弈方法分析私人过度投资行为以及对政府最优补偿契约的影响，并在私人过度自信不可观察情形下，讨论政府对最优补偿契约的设计和选择。研究表明：虽然私人过度投资行为并不一定有助于项目预期社会效益改善，但政府可通过相应地调整契约参数来设计适应私人不同过度自信行为的最优补偿契约，并当私人过度投资不可观测时，根据其过度自信的概率分布情况来选择使项目预期社会效益比较大的最优补偿契约。

具体地，本文研究内容概括为如下几个部分：

第一部分，即第一章。基于我国当前新型城镇化举措的实施，引出了PPP融资模式与PPP项目政府补偿问题，由此展开相关文献综述和分析，并指出现有研究不足之处及发展趋势，进而给出本文的创新之处和研究思路。

第二部分，即第二章。通过理清PPP项目的基本概念和特征，从PPP项目的准公共物品属性出发，讨论补偿的必要性和主要方式，着重通过比较事前和事后两种补偿方式，引出PPP项目补偿的契约问题，并给出相应的数学模型表示。

第三部分，即第三章和第四章。第三章首先分析了私人投资PPP项目的过度自信行为的影响因素与表现特征，并给出相应的数学描述；然后基于“均值-方差”描述，引入私人投资的过度自信系数，构建私人期望效用函数，从而分析私人过度投资策略；最后，在私人过度自信可观察情形下，运用主从博弈分析政府最优补偿契约以及受私人过度自信的影响，并在私人过度自信不可观察情形下，讨论政府对最优补偿契约的设计与选择。第四章结合PPP项目实例，借助数值分析对所获研究结果进行检验和拓展，从而给出更加符合实际的PPP项目补偿对策。

最后部分，即第五章。主要对全文的研究内容进行总结和展望，既总结了本文已获得的研究结论，也指出了本文还有待进一步研究的问题。

关键词：PPP项目 补偿契约 过度自信 不可观察

Compensation Contract for PPP Project Based on Private Overconfidence

Abstract

With the development of urbanization, the billions will be plowed into infrastructure in recent years, but just relying on the government's financial capital is unable to meet the investment demand of building the infrastructure. Therefore, a mode called PPP has been put forward, and has become a main way to meet the investment demand and reduce the financial stress. The PPP mode has been widely used in the world, but the operating revenue of PPP project limited to the quasi-public goods is so low in the future that it is difficult for the private sector to take back their huge initial investment. This means it’s important for government to give the private investor compensation properly, if the government wants PPP project successful.

It is difficult for the government to determine the compensation before the event. Too high compensation leads to increase social costs, which will reduce the overall welfare of society; too low compensation leads to do damage to private interest, which will make construction inefficient. As a result, a compensation mechanism after the event should be designed for the PPP project. Based on the decision-making dilemma of governmental compensation for the PPP project, a single period compensation contract is introduced for the private investor. In the meantime, the private overconfidence behavior is considered under the governmental compensation, and is described by the “Mean-Variance” in which the private overconfidence coefficient is introduced. Thus the private expected utility function related to the overconfidence preference is proposed. Accordingly, the private overconfidence investment strategy is given out and the effect on the governmental optimal compensation contract is studied by the method of Stackelberg game. And then under the circumstance that the private overconfidence can’t be observed, the design and selection of optimal compensation contract is discussed. This research contents include the following sections:

The first part is the first chapter. Base on the actual background of infrastructure investment, the government needs to adopt the PPP mode to broaden the financing channels, so that the investment demand of infrastructure building will de meet. In addition, the government must provide compensation to ensure the project go smoothly. The researches on the compensation for the PPP project and overconfidence behavior are arranged and summarized. This section also points out the deficiency of existing research, and gives the specific train of thought.

The second part is the second chapter. By sorting out basic concepts and characteristics of PPP projects, this section analyses the necessity of PPP project compensation from two angles of benefit and risk; compares the advantages and disadvantages of the PPP project compensation in before and after the two ways. By raising compensation contract and model representation, this section provides a basis for the next section.

The third part consists of the third chapter and the fourth chapter. The third chapter firstly combs the influence factors and characteristics of overconfidence behavior, and summarizes mathematical description of overconfidence behavior. Then, the private overconfidence coefficient is introduced and the private expected utility function related to the overconfidence preference is proposed. Last, overconfidence behavior can be divided into two circumstances—observed action and unobserved action. The private overconfidence investment strategy is given out and the effect on the governmental optimal compensation contract is studied by the method of Stackelberg game. The fourth chapter tests the results of the third chapter through the numerical analysis and gives the government more practical advice.

The fourth part is the fifth chapter. This section summarizes the research contents consisting of the whole dissertation. This part not only sums up the research conclusion which has obtained, but also points out some questions which must be studied in the future.

Keywords: PPP project; compensation contract; overconfidence behavior; unobserved action

目 录

摘 要 I

Abstract III

图表目录 VII

第一章 绪论 1

1.1研究意义 1

1.2国内外研究现状 2

1.2.1 PPP项目政府补偿研究 2

1.2.2 投资者过度自信行为研究 3

1.2.3 现有研究不足之处及发展趋势 5

1.3研究思路 5

第二章 PPP项目政府补偿的契约问题与模型表示 7

2.1 PPP项目的基本概念与特征 7

2.1.1 PPP项目的基本概念 7

2.1.2 PPP项目的基本特征 8

2.1.3 PPP项目的不完全契约性 9

2.2 PPP项目补偿的必要性及主要方式 10

2.2.1 PPP项目补偿的必要性 10

2.2.2 PPP项目补偿的主要方式 10

2.3 PPP项目补偿的契约问题与模型表示 12

2.3.1 PPP项目补偿的契约问题 12

2.3.2 PPP项目补偿的模型表示 12

第三章 基于私人过度自信的PPP项目最优补偿契约 14

3.1 PPP项目私人投资的过度自信行为及数学描述 14

3.1.1 PPP项目私人过度自信的影响因素 14

3.1.2 PPP项目私人过度自信的数学描述 15

3.2 PPP项目政府补偿下过度自信私人最优投资策略 15

3.2.1 私人投资决策模型 15

3.2.2 模型求解与分析 16

3.3 私人过度自信条件下PPP项目最优补偿契约 18

3.3.1 私人过度自信可观察情形 19

3.3.2 私人过度自信不可观察情形 21

第四章 私人过度自信影响PPP项目补偿的实例分析 24

4.1 PPP项目实例 24

4.2 数值分析 24

4.2.1 私人过度自信对其最优投资的影响 24

4.2.2 私人过度自信对最优补偿契约的影响 25

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