State aid to car companies: Were government responses to the auto industry crisis different in the United States and Europe?

Coates-Chaney, Charles Kingsley.

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.bPolitical Science: TransAtlantic Masters (off-campus).

摘要：2008年和2009年的全球经济衰退对汽车公司的打击尤为严重。大西洋两岸都感受到了这种影响。在这次危机中，各国政府以许多支持私人金融和工业的项目作为回应，这些项目必须在世贸组织和欧盟的竞争规则中发挥作用。在美国，通用汽车(General Motors)和克莱斯勒(Chrysler)获得了数十亿美元的担保贷款、汽车报废计划和破产保护。在欧洲，法国政府向其国家冠军PSA和Renault提供了数十亿欧元的贷款，并提供汽车报废计划和对个别工厂的援助。德国政府将援助重点放在汽车报废计划和对目标工厂的援助上。最后，不同的监管环境对不同的国家援助项目的影响比国内行业的差异更小。

关键词：金融危机，应对措施

应对经济衰退。政府制定了各种方案。不同国家的项目在会将面对不同的经济衰退因素，以及不同的监管环境。所以，各国所制定的应对措施是不同的。当他们做出相同的应对措施，则表明他们的汽车行业遇到了相似的危机。提振经济和汽车制造业，尤其重要。国内有大型汽车公司的国家。旧车换现金计划提供了一种方法。

美国和欧洲由于免税，可能会获得大笔现金贷款救助。在世贸组织和欧盟的贸易规则下，帮助那些濒临倒闭的公司重组。如通用汽车、克莱斯勒、PSA、雷诺等。由于免税，美国和欧洲可能会获得大笔现金贷款救助。

法国提供了数十亿美元的贷款。之所以这么做，是因为它的汽车公司比其他公司更好地经受住了经济衰退的考验。

2008年和2009年的全球经济衰退对汽车公司的打击尤为严重。大西洋两岸都感受到了这种影响。在这次危机中，各国政府以许多支持私人金融和工业的项目作为回应，这些项目必须在世贸组织和欧盟的竞争规则中发挥作用。在美国，通用汽车(General Motors)和克莱斯勒(Chrysler)获得了数十亿美元的担保贷款、汽车报废计划和破产保护。在欧洲，法国政府向其国家冠军PSA (PSA)和雷诺(Renault)提供了数十亿欧元的贷款，并提供汽车报废计划和对个别工厂的援助。德国政府将援助重点放在汽车报废计划和对目标工厂的援助上。最后，不同的监管环境对不同的国家援助项目的影响比国内行业的差异更小。

Car makers in countries in both regions were truly in danger during the worst of the

recent recession. Governments responded with various programs. It would seem that the

programs in different countries would have been different in the two regions because of the

differing factors of the recession, as well as their different regulatory environments.

However, the similarities between the programs can be seen as a result of the similarities in

the regulatory environments under which the two regions must operate.

Large cash loan bailouts were possible in the US and Europe because of exemptions

given in WTO and EU trade rules to help rescue companies on the verge of failure to

restructure. This restructuring is what is taking place with GM, Chrysler, PSA, Renault, and

Opel. Germany ultimately did not provide the same kind of bailout packages that the US and

France did because its car companies weathered the recession better than others, with the

exception of Opel. Opel was not able to secure government financing largely because it was a

subsidiary of GM, which, by refusing to sell the division during its own restructuring,

implied that it would be able to restructure the company with internal funding.

The car scrappage programs present in the three countries can be explained as a way

to boost the economy and auto manufacturing generally, but it was especially important in

countries with large domestic companies. The scrappage programs provided a way for

government to provide assistance to companies without giving a preference to any one

company, which would have been in violation of WTO or EU trade rules. Fuel economy or

emissions standards limitations on new cars purchased under these programs also allowed for

exemptions under environmental concerns in both regions – especially useful for Frances

electric car industry. Additionally, the scrappage programs were a way to quell the potential

protests of foreign manufacturers.

The difference in additional funding is clear when considering funding for other

financial operations and tax incentives. GM was extraordinary in being allowed to keep so

many tax credits from before its bankruptcy. Frances support of PSA Financial may be

rescue and restructuring aid, but it is still unclear if it truly qualifies as not favoring only one

company. Germanys support of domestic factories only shows that even without big bailouts,

it slipped in aid under research and development and environmental retooling exemptions.

Frances additional support for unemployment benefits of laid-off car factory workers is an

expense to be counted under bailouts, because the higher unemployment benefits come from

tax-payer money, and they allow a company a competitive advantage because they can more

easily lay off workers, saving them money.

State aid rules provided the regulatory environment under which the countries

governments had to work. Although it may seem like governments worked to escape the

competition rules, they were in fact altering their programs in order to work within their

confines: France was not allowed to tie state aid to protecting domestic auto industry

employment. Germany did not end up challenging Frances aid to Banque PSA Finance

because the Commission only allowed a limited amount of the loan to be disbursed. China

and the US did clash over auto aid, but the end of this challenge is still not clear. The

competition policies in both are enforceable: in the US the WTO can receive challenges and

34

allow contravening tariffs, and the EU Commission has the power (with the ECJ) to fine

governments for breaking the rules. The other side to state aid rules bending to allow for

increased government intervention is the fact that governments actually did keep their aid

policies within the confines of allowable state aid. The governments may have wanted to do

more to aid their domestic producers, and in the past tariffs were the solution, but the strength

of WTO and EU rules moves away from protectionism toward state aid. Even though state

aid programs may be sometimes questionable, governments follow the rules of the WTO and

EU, understanding the real consequences for taking state aid too far.

The differing nature of the EU and WTO rules allowed them to keep legitimacy

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State aid to car companies: Were government responses to the auto industry crisis different in the United States and Europe?

Car makers in countries in both regions were truly in danger during the worst of the

recent recession. Governments responded with various programs. It would seem that the

programs in different countries would have been different in the two regions because of the

differing factors of the recession, as well as their different regulatory environments.

However, the similarities between the programs can be seen as a result of the similarities in

the regulatory environments under which the two regions must operate.

Large cash loan bailouts were possible in the US and Europe because of exemptions

given in WTO and EU trade rules to help rescue companies on the verge of failure to

restructure. This restructuring is what is taking place with GM, Chrysler, PSA, Renault, and

Opel. Germany ultimately did not provide the same kind of bailout packages that the US and

France did because its car companies weathered the recession better than others, with the

exception of Opel. Opel was not able to secure government financing largely because it was a

subsidiary of GM, which, by refusing to sell the division during its own restructuring,

implied that it would be able to restructure the company with internal funding.

The car scrappage programs present in the three countries can be explained as a way

to boost the economy and auto manufacturing generally, but it was especially important in

countries with large domestic companies. The scrappage programs provided a way for

government to provide assistance to companies without giving a preference to any one

company, which would have been in violation of WTO or EU trade rules. Fuel economy or

emissions standards limitations on new cars purchased under these programs also allowed for

exemptions under environmental concerns in both regions – especially useful for Frances

electric car industry. Additionally, the scrappage programs were a way to quell the potential

protests of foreign manufacturers.

The difference in additional funding is clear when considering funding for other

financial operations and tax incentives. GM was extraordinary in being allowed to keep so

many tax credits from before its bankruptcy. Frances support of PSA Financial may be

rescue and restructuring aid, but it is still unclear if it truly qualifies as not favoring only one

company. Germanys support of domestic factories only shows that even without big bailouts,

it slipped in aid under research and development and environmental retooling exemptions.

Frances additional support for unemployment benefits of laid-off car factory workers is an

expense to be counted under bailouts, because the higher unemployment benefits come from

tax-payer money, and they allow a company a competitive advantage because they can more

easily lay off workers, saving them money.

State aid rules provided the regulatory environment under which the countries

governments had to work. Although it may seem like governments worked to escape the

competition rules, they were in fact altering their programs in order to work within their

confines: France was not allowed to tie state aid to protecting domestic auto industry

employment. Germany did not end up challenging Frances aid to Banque PSA Finance

because the Commission only allowed a limited amount of the loan to be disbursed. China

and the US did clash over auto aid, but the end of this challenge is still not clear. The

competition policies in both are enforceable: in the US the WTO can receive challenges and

34

allow contravening tariffs, and the EU Commission has the power (with the ECJ) to fine

governments for breaking the rules. The other side to state aid rules bending to allow for

increased government intervention is the fact that governments actually did keep their aid

policies within the confines of allowable state aid. The governments may have wanted to do

more to aid their domestic producers, and in the past tariffs were the solution, but the strength

of WTO and EU rules moves away from protectionism toward state aid. Even though state

aid programs may be sometimes questionable, governments follow the rules of the WTO and

EU, understanding the real consequences for taking state aid too far.

The differing nature of the EU and WTO rules allowed them to keep legitimacy as

well. Even before state-aid programs were being considered for the auto industries, the EU

revised and issued special rules for the crisis. The Commission recognized that, in order to

keep legitimacy, it would need to be very specific about what kinds of aid would be available

to governments during the crisis. With the WTO, the nature of enforcement being based more

on governments challenging each others practices kept them from having to issue

clarifications on the eve of crisis.

For the most part, there has been a lack of challenges to these policies because of the

similar situation in Europe and the US The governments all wanted to protect employment in

their countries, and that was done by aiding the manufacturers. The only reason that

governments needed to provide this protection was because domestic labor costs were so

high (even though foreign makers operate profitable factories in the same regions, the

perception remains). Car scrappage schemes were similar because WTO and EU rules were

so similar (especially considering EU countries also operate under WTO rules). Only the tax

carryforwards that the U

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