论文总字数：16577字

摘 要

城市化进程中的征地运动的从本质上来讲是一个各利益主体之间博弈的过程，也是一个典型的利益再分配过程，在这个过程中博弈主体分别为中央政府、地方政府以及失地农民。在该博弈中因为所征收土地的产权不明晰、多博弈方的信息获取量的不对等、行政地位不平等以及土地征收过程不完善和土地补偿制度不健全等因素，失地农民往往会成为弱势一方损失应得的利益补偿。

不同于过往那些把重点安置于分析征地冲突起因、种类、冲突结果、评价管理方法的论文研究，本文的核心是基于中国的国情，运用博弈论分别建立静态模型和动态演化模型对各参与 主体进行分析。本文首先对中央政府与地方政府，中央政府与失地农民分别建立静态博弈模型进行分析，得出以下结论：（1）地方政府不给予失地农民可接受补偿的概率与中央政府实行的监管所需付出的成本有着正相关的关系，和中央政府对地方政府的经济处罚力度有反相关的关系；同时中央政府采用监管策略的概率与地方政府在征地过程中的违法收益有着正相关的关系，与中央政府对地方政府的经济处罚力度和政绩的损害有着反相关的关系。（2）当地政府是否采用征地过程中违法牟利这一策略还得由失地农民的上访成本、征地过程赔偿的数额、中央政府进行检查的成本、被中央政府经济惩处的标准等因素来共同决定。之后对地方政府与失地农民建立演化博弈模型，分析结果表明：当失地农民采取维权策略比顺从策略收益高时，也就是说失地农民选择上访维权的斗争策略并且当局选择妥协策略时，此博弈过程趋于平衡；当失地农民选择顺从不维权而政府选择斗争策略时，博弈趋于平衡。而在现实中这种平衡通常是因为博弈双方所获得的信息不对称造成的。地方政府在利益驱使下滥用行政权力，而失地农民则通常处在弱势的地位，虽然自身利益受到侵害，没有得到应得的失地补偿，但不得不选择顺从妥协的策略。

这将为当下构建征地过程中的补偿体系提供一个相对可参考的模型。为了营造征地补偿过程中多赢博弈的格局，政府应当完善城市化征地中的法律制度，应当提高失地补偿标准并且丰富补偿方式，建立以政府为主导的失地农民补偿机制，最大程度地维护失地农民的合法权益，并且通过监管确保其有条不紊地实施；另一方面农民要增强自身的博弈能力，通过有效的手段维护自己的合法权益。

关键词：博弈论；征地冲突；纳什均衡；演化博弈

Abstract

The essence of the movement of land in the urbanization process is a process of game between different interest subjects, as well as a typical interest redistribution process, respectively in the main process of game for the central government, local government and farmers. In this game because the land property right is not clear, many players' access to information is wrong, such as administrative status inequality and land expropriation process factors such as incomplete and imperfect land compensation system, land-lost farmers will become the disadvantaged party who loss deserved compensation.

This article is different from the past ones which put emphasis on the analysis for the cause of land expropriation conflicts, type, management method of the thesis research results and evaluation.The core of this article is based on China's national conditions, by using game theory respectively set up static model and dynamic evolution model to analyze each participation main body. This article first set up static game models to carry on the analysis between the central government and local governments, the central government and the farmers , then drew on the conclusions as follows : (1) the local government who does not give land-lost farmers can receive compensation of probability and the central government's regulatory costs of has a positive correlation relationship, and the central government to local government economic penalties has anti related relationship; At the same time, the probability of regulation strategy is used by the central government and local government in the process of land expropriation illegal income has a positive correlation relationship, with the central government to local government economic penalties and achievements of damage relations with the related. (2) whether the local government use illegal profit this strategy in the process of land expropriation have to cost by the petition of the farmers, the amount of compensation for land expropriation process, the inspection cost, by the central government of the central government economic punishment factors such as the standard to decide together. After the local government and farmers to establish evolution game model, the analysis results show that when the land-lost farmers rights strategy than compliance strategy when yields high, that is to say, farmers choose the petition rights struggle strategy and authorities choose compromise strategy, the game process into balance; When land-losing farmers have no choice but to choose to obey the government when choosing a strategy game back into balance. In reality this balance is not uncommon because the game usually caused by information asymmetry. Driven by abusing their administrative power, in the interests of local government and farmers are often in a weak position, though their interests are violated, didn't get the losses due to the compensation, but had to choose to compromise strategy.

This will be the present building in the process of land expropriation compensation system provides a relative reference model. To build to win more games in the process of land expropriation compensation pattern, the government should perfect the legal system of urban land expropriation, should improve the land-lost compensation standard and compensation mode, establish the government-led land-lost farmers compensation mechanism, to maintain the legitimate rights and interests of land-lost farmers, and through the supervision to ensure the orderly implementation; On the other hand, the farmers to enhance their ability of game, through effective means to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of oneself.

Key words: Game theory; Land conflicts; Nash equilibrium; Evolutionary game

目录

摘 要 I

第一章 引言 1

1.1 研究目的及意义 1

1.2 研究相关背景 1

1.2.1 国外相关研究回顾 1

1.2.2 国内相关研究回顾 2

1.3 本文的研究方法及创新点 4

第二章 地方政府,中央政府与失地农民间的静态博弈模型 4

2.1 理论静态模型概述 4

2.2 地方政府与失地农民之间的静态博弈模型 5

2.3中央政府与地方政府之间的静态博弈模型 6

2.4中央政府与失地农民之间的静态博弈模型 7

第三章 地方政府与失地农民间的动态演化博弈模型 8

3.1 理论动态模型概述 8

3.2 地方政府与失地农民间的动态演化博弈模型分析 11

第四章 结论与建议 15

4.1增加失地农民的征地收益 15

4.2减少失地农民的维权成本 16

4.3加大征地过程中政府违法行为的惩罚力度 16

参考文献 17

致谢 19

第一章 引言

1.1 研究目的及意义

新型城市化建设是当前中国社会经济发展的重要战略任务之一，然而在城市化进程中我国目前仍然面临着很多制度上的难题。比如失地农民进城后所获的利益补偿问题长期都没有得到解决，征地冲突问题严重影响到了我国城镇化的质量。近年来如何构建征地过程中多方利益关系也成为了众多学者关注的目标，他们得出的大致相似的看法是：地方政府是土地城市化的受益者，同时也是政策的推动者，在分配问题中由于征地制度的不完善造成了诸多的分歧和分配不公，在这种条件下农民很难分享到土地城市化所带来的收益，合法权益和利益都遭受了严重的损害。城市化进程中的征地运动是一个利益博弈的过程，从根本上来讲是中央政府、地方政府以及失地农民之间的博弈。地方政府的目的是低价征收尽可能多的农用土体，另一方失地农民则理所当然地希望自身利益得到最大化。本文将基于博弈论的视角对牵涉其中的各方之间复杂的利益关系进行研究和分析，在这种基础上，希望可以提出合理的博弈途径和策略建议，来实现失地农民经济补偿利益的最大化。

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