There is no great share of probity necessary to support a monarchical or despotic government. The force of laws in one, and the princes arm in the other, are sufficient to direct and maintain the whole. But in a popular state, one spring more is necessary, namely, virtue.

　　What I have here advanced is confirmed by the unanimous testimony of historians, and is extremely agreeable to the nature of things. For it is clear that in a monarchy, where he who commands the execution of the laws generally thinks himself above them, there is less need of virtue than in a popular government, where the person entrusted with the execution of the laws is sensible of his being subject to their direction.

　　Clear is it also that a monarch who, through bad advice or indolence, ceases to enforce the execution of the laws, may easily repair the evil; he has only to follow other advice; or to shake off this indolence. But when, in a popular government, there is a suspension of the laws, as this can proceed only from the corruption of the republic, the state is certainly undone.

　　A very droll spectacle it was in the last century to behold the impotent efforts of the English towards the establishment of democracy. As they who had a share in the direction of public affairs were void of virtue; as their ambition was inffamed by the success of the most daring of their members;2 as the prevailing parties were successively animated by the spirit of faction, the government was continually changing: the people, amazed at so many revolutions, in vain attempted to erect a commonwealth. At length, when the country had undergone the most violent shocks, they were obliged to have recourse to the very government which they had so wantonly proscribed.

　　When Sylla thought of restoring Rome to her liberty, this unhappy city was incapable of receiving that blessing. She had only the feeble remains of virtue, which were continually diminishing. Instead of being roused from her lethargy by C?sar, Tiberius, Caius Claudius, Nero, and Domitian, she riveted every day her chains; if she struck some blows, her aim was at the tyrant, not at the tyranny.

　　The politic Greeks, who lived under a popular government, knew no other support than virtue. The modern inhabitants of that country are entirely taken up with manufacture, commerce, finances, opulence, and luxury.

　　When virtue is banished, ambition invades the minds of those who are disposed to receive it, and avarice possesses the whole community. The objects of their desires are changed; what they were fond of before has become indifferent; they were free while under the restraint of laws, but they would fain now be free to act against law; and as each citizen is like a slave who has run away from his master, that which was a maxim of equity he calls rigour; that which was a rule of action he styles constraint; and to precaution he gives the name of fear. Frugality, and not the thirst of gain, now passes for avarice. Formerly the wealth of individuals constituted the public treasure; but now this has become the patrimony of private persons. The members of the commonwealth riot on the public spoils, and its strength is only the power of a few, and the licence of many.

　　Athens was possessed of the same number of forces when she triumphed so gloriously as when with such infamy she was enslaved. She had twenty thousand citizens3 when she defended the Greeks against the Persians, when she contended for empire with Sparta, and invaded Sicily. She had twenty thousand when Demetrius Phalereus numbered them4 as slaves are told by the head in a market-place. When Philip attempted to lord it over Greece, and appeared at the gates of Athens5 she had even then lost nothing but time. We may see in Demosthenes how difficult it was to awaken her; she dreaded Philip, not as the enemy of her liberty, but of her pleasures.6 This famous city, which had withstood so many defeats, and having been so often destroyed had as often risen out of her ashes, was overthrown at Ch?ronea, and at one blow deprived of all hopes of resource. What does it avail her that Philip sends back her prisoners, if he does not return her men? It was ever after as easy to triumph over the forces of Athens as it had been difficult to subdue her virtue.

　　How was it possible for Carthage to maintain her ground? When Hannibal, upon his being made pr?tor, endeavoured to hinder the magistrates from plundering the republic, did not they complain of him to the Romans? Wretches, who would fain be citizens without a city, and be beholden for their riches to their very destroyers! Rome soon insisted upon having three hundred of their principal citizens as hostages; she obliged them next to surrender their arms and ships; and then she declared war.7 From the desperate efforts of this defenceless city, one may judge of what she might have performed in her full vigour, and assisted by virtue.

　　4. Of the Principle of Aristocracy. As virtue is necessary in a popular government, it is requisite also in an aristocracy. True it is that in the latter it is not so absolutely requisite.

　　The people, who in respect to the nobility are the same as the subjects with regard to a monarch, are restrained by their laws. They have, therefore, less occasion for virtue than the people in a democracy. But how are the nobility to be restrained? They who are to execute the laws against their colleagues will immediately perceive that they are acting against themselves. Virtue is therefore necessary in this body, from the very nature of the constitution.

　　An aristocratic government has an inherent vigour, unknown to democracy. The nobles form a body, who by their prerogative, and for their own particular interest, restrain the people; it is sufficient that there are laws in being to see them executed.

　　But easy as it may be for the body of the nobles to restrain the people, it is

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维持或支撑君主政体或是专制政体并不需要很多的道义。前者有法律的力量，后者有经常举着的君主的手臂，可以去管理或支持一切。但是在一个平民政治的国家，使需要另一种动力，那就是品德。所有历史家都已证实，而且是很符合于事物的性质的。因为一个君主国里执行法律的人，显然自己认为是超乎法律之上的，所以需要的品德少于平民政治的国家。平民政治的国家里执行法律的人觉得本身也要服从法律，并负担责任。

由于听信坏的劝告或是由于疏忽以致停止执行法律的君主，能够容易地

补救这个过失，这也是显然的。他只要改换樞密院，成改正自己的疏忽就够

了。但是平民政治，如果法律被停止执行，这只能是由于共和国的腐化而产

生的，所以国家就已经是完蛋了

在上世纪，英国人要给自己建立民主政治；他们未能获得成效的努力，

可称奇观。因为那些参与政事的人毫无品德；因为那位最大胆的人①的成功激

起了他们的野心；因为宗派主义浸透了一个又一个的得势的党派，所以政府

不断地更迭；惊愕了的人民寻求民主政治，但却什么地方也找不到。最后，

在经历许多动乱、冲击、震荡之后，他们不能不重新回到到他们所廢止了的

那种政体之下去休息。

当苏拉愿意把自由还给罗马的时候，罗马不能再接受自由了。它只残留

着微少的品德。因为它的品德天天在减少着，所以在凯撒、提见留斯、盖犹

斯、格老狄鸟斯、尼祿、多米先之后，罗马并没有清醒过来，所受奴役反而

日益加深。一切的攻击，全都是对着暴君，却没有一次是对着暴政的。

斯、格老狄鸟斯、尼祿、多米先之后，罗马并没有清醒过来，所受奴役反而

日益加深。一切的攻击，全都是对着暴君，却没有一次是对着暴政的。

今天的希腊人则仅仅同我们谈工艺、贸易、财政、财富，甚

至谈奢侈。

当品德消逝的时候，野心便进入那些能够接受野心的人们的心里，而贪

婪则进入一切人们的心里。欲望改变了目标：过去人们所喜爱的，现在不再

喜爱了；过去人们因有法律而获得自由，现在要求自由，好去反抗法律；每

一个公民都好象是从主人家里逃跑出来的奴隶；人们把过去的准则说成严

厉，把过去的规规矩成拘束，把过去的谨慎叫做畏缩。在那里，节剑被看做

贪婪；而占有欲却不是贪婪。从前，私人的财产是公共的财宝；但是现在，

公共的财宝变成了私人的家业，共和国就成了巧取豪夺的对象。它的力量就

只是几个公民的权力和全体的放肆而已。

当雅典很显赫地称霸四邻的时候，同它很可耻地遭受奴役的时候，它所

拥有的兵力是一样的。当它防卫希腊反抗波斯的时候，当它和拉栖代孟争帝

国的时候，当它进攻西西里的时候，它的公民是两万人。当狄米特里鸟斯·法

列累烏斯稽核它的人口就如同人们在市场上数奴隶一样的时候，它的公民是

两万人。当菲利普敢于统治希腊，而出现在雅典人的门前的时候，它仍然坐

失了时间。在德漠斯提尼斯的著作里，人们可以看见使希腊清醒过来是如何

困难：雅典人怕菲利普，不是因为菲利普是自由的敌人，而是因为他是逸乐

的敌人。从前，这个城市曾经抗住了那么多次的失败，人们看见它从毁灭中

又复兴起来。但它在凯龙尼亚一败之后，就永远失败了。虽然菲利普把所有

的俘虏都遣还了，但是有什么用处呢！他所谴还的并不是战士！这时要战胜

雅典的军队总是容易的了，正如要战胜它的品德总是困难的一样。

迦太基怎么能够站得住呢？当汉尼拔任“裁判官”要禁止官吏们掠夺这

个共各国的时候，官吏们不是到罗马人那里去控告他么？可怜虫啊！他们不

要城市，但又要做公民，并且还要用他们的毁灭者的手去保持自己的财产！

不久罗马要求他们用迦太基的主要公民三百人为質，以后又让他们把军械和

船只交出来，未后向他们宣战。从被解除了武装后迦太基在绝望中所做的决

死战去看，人们便能够了解，当迦太基还有军力时，如果再有品德的话，它

还能够有多么大的成就！

平民政治需要品德，贵族政治也需要品德；不过贵族政治不是那样绝对地需要它，这也是真的。人民和贵族的关系，正象臣民和君主的关系一样。人民是受法律的拘束的。所以贵族政治下的人民比民主政治下的人民较少需要品德。但是贵族受什么样的拘束呢？那些执行法律来约束同事的人们，很快将会感到他们的行动也是不利于自己。因此，按照政制的性质，贵族团体是需要品德的。什么样的拘束呢？那些执行法律来约束同事的人们，很快将会感到他们的行动也是不利于自己。因此，按照政制的性质，贵族团体是需要品德的。个团体。这个团体，依据它的特权，并为着私人的利益，抑制人民。只要有法律，并且在这一方面获得执行，就够了。但是贵族团体抑制别人容易，抑制自己却是困难的。这种政制的性质就是这样，所以看来就象是把贵族放在法律权威之下，而又使贵族置身于法律之外。

那未，这样一个团体只有两种抑制自己的方法。一个是以高尚的品德，

使量族和人民多少平等些，这可能形成一个大共和国。另一个是以较小的品

德，也就是说以某种程度的节制使量族们至少在贵族之间是平等的，这样他

们就能够存在下去。

因此，节制是贵州政治的灵魂，我指的是那种以品德为基础的节制，而

不是那种出自精神上的畏缩和怠情的节制。

第五节品德绝非君主政体的原则

在君主国里，人们通过政策经营巨大事业，但是尽可能少用品德。这就象在最美好的机器里，人们通过技术尽叫能减少机件、发条和齿轮的数目一样。

君主国家的生存并不依赖爱国心、追求真正光荣的欲望、舍弃自己、牺牲自己最宝贵的利益，以及我们只听说的古人所会有过的一切英雄的品德。

在君主国里，法律代替了所有这一切品德的地位；人们对品德没有任何需要；国家也不要求人们具备这些品德。在君主国里，个行为，只要是不声不响地去做的话，多多少少是没有人追究的。虽然一切的犯罪都是公罪性质，但是人们仍然把真正的公罪和私罪分开，所以叫做私罪，是因为它们对私人的侵犯多于对整个社会的侵犯。在共和国里，私罪有较多的公罪性质，意思就是说，它们触犯国家的政制多于触犯私人；而在材主国里，公罪有较多的私罪性质意思就是说，它们触犯私人的幸福多于触犯国家的政制本身。我请求人们对我所说的话不要介意，一切历史可作证明。我们知道，有品德的君主并不在少数，但是我说的是，在君主国里人民要有品德是很困难的。

让人们读一读各时代历史家关于君主们的朝廷的记述吧！让人们回忆一下各国的人关于廷臣们的卑鄙性格的谈话吧！这些谈话绝不是臆想，而是来自悲痛的经验。

好闲逸而有野心，骄傲而卑鄙，希望不劳而致富，憎恶真理，谄媚、背信、弃义，不遵守一切诺言，蔑视公民职责，惧怕君主有品德，希望君主有弱点，而且比这一切都糟的是，永远向品德嘲笑——这些东西。

在那里，公罪可能受到惩治，因为与众人有关；私罪则不加惩治，因为与众人无关，无须加以惩治。 我这时所指的是“政治品德”。“lsquo;政治品德”，在它以公共福利为目的这一意义上，是道德上品德，

我所指的，绝少是么人道德上的品德，而且绝不是那种同宗教上一天启的真理“有关系的品德。这在本书第 5章第 2节可以清楚地看到了各地方、各时代最大多数延臣的显著性格。那末，在一个国家里，首脑人物多半是不诚实的人，而要求在下的人全都是善人；首脑人物是骗子，而要求在下的人同意只做受骗的呆子；这是极难能的事。

英文原件：《论法的精神》

There is no great share of probity necessary to support a monarchical or despotic government. The force of laws in one, and the princes arm in the other, are sufficient to direct and maintain the whole. But in a popular state, one spring more is necessary, namely, virtue.

　　What I have here advanced is confirmed by the unanimous testimony of historians, and is extremely agreeable to the nature of things. For it is clear that in a monarchy, where he who commands the execution of the laws generally thinks himself above them, there is less need of virtue than in a popular government, where the person entrusted with the execution of the laws is sensible of his being subject to their direction.

　　Clear is it also that a monarch who, through bad advice or indolence, ceases to enforce the execution of the laws, may easily repair the evil; he has only to follow other advice; or to shake off this indolence. But when, in a popular government, there is a suspension of the laws, as this can proceed only from the corruption of the republic, the state is certainly undone.

　　A very droll spectacle it was in the last century to behold the impotent efforts of the English towards the establishment of democracy. As they who had a share in the direction of public affairs were void of virtue; as their ambition was inffamed by the success of the most daring of their members;2 as the prevailing parties were successively animated by the spirit of faction, the government was continually changing: the people, amazed at so many revolutions, in vain attempted to erect a commonwealth. At length, when the country had undergone the most violent shocks, they were obliged to have recourse to the very government which they had so wantonly proscribed.

　　When Sylla thought of restoring Rome to her liberty, this unhappy city was incapable of receiving that blessing. She had only the feeble remains of virtue, which were continually diminishing. Instead of being roused from her lethargy by C?sar, Tiberius, Caius Claudius, Nero, and Domitian, she riveted every day her chains; if she struck some blows, her aim was at the tyrant, not at the tyranny.

　　The politic Greeks, who lived under a popular government, knew no other support than virtue. The modern inhabitants of that country are entirely taken up with manufacture, commerce, finances, opulence, and luxury.

　　When virtue is banished, ambition invades the minds of those who are disposed to receive it, and avarice possesses the whole community. The objects of their desires are changed; what they were fond of before has become indifferent; they were free while under the restraint of laws, but they would

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