简介:利己主义，利他主义和公正

原文作者 ：Cillian Mcbride,Jonathan Seglow

单位：1Department of Government, London School of Economics 2Department of Social and Political Science, Royal Holloway, University of London

摘要：利己主义动机和利他主义动机之间的区别深深植根于当代道德话语中，但也可以追溯到早期现代人试图在利己主义的基础上建立道德。对于后一个假设的拒绝意味着接受他人的利益具有内在价值，但利他主义对我们的要求是什么，利他主义与其他道德之间的关系是什么仍然不清楚。在告知我们义务的同时，利他主义似乎在敦促我们超越这些义务，拥抱构成更美好生活的价值观和美德。这种相当宽泛的道德观今天可能会让我们觉得太苛刻。然而，与此同时，当前流行的仙女对道德的描述可能会在很大程度上扰乱日常的利他主义，因为她们坚持认为每个人的利益都是准确和平等衡量的。在概述了利他主义问题之后，简介的后半部分概述了这四篇论文的论点，在这个论文集中，每一篇文章都以不同的方式讨论了利己主义、利他主义、道德和公正之间的复杂关系。^[1]

关键词：利他主义； 利己主义； 公正；道德

日常道德话语仍然被利己主义和利他主义之间的简单对比所支配，可以说，自霍布斯以来，利他主义一直支配着现代道德哲学。今天，大众科普的宣传册要求我们通过进化的角度来看待我们自己，因为我们的基因决定了我们的行为方式，从而确保我们基因的存续。如爱情，我们最自发和最天真的行为，现在被彻底重新描述，这表明它们只是无意识的策略，以确保我们的DNA进入人类生存竞争的下一个阶段。在这种观点的更复杂的版本我们不试图揭穿关于爱、友谊和公民美德的常识，而是把它们解释为使社会生活成为可能的进化产物。¹

这些观点是建立在牢固的、不容置疑的利己主义基础上霍布斯建立政治性结社计划的直接产物，他们让我们重看18世纪后期关于论德性派与玩世不恭的“霍布斯主义者”之间的道德动机本质的争论。在对利己主义的诉求背后，存在着一个同样的社会梦想，即社会是一个巨大的机器，在曼德维尔在他的讽刺美德的作品《蜜蜂的寓言》中，利己通过的个人之间的互利互动而保持运转。²另一些人虽然被这一模式所吸引，但他们怀疑，仅靠自身利益能否很好地监管这一机制——需要一位细心的立法者来监督这一机制。然而，立法者自己的动机是什么?他的奉献从何而来，不仅是为了他自己的利益，而是为了大多数人的利益?如果社会机器的监督者的利他动机能够真正融入到它的运作中，那么，也许它确实能够永远起作用;但是，如果他的动机是别有用心的，那么，也许设计中毕竟存在一个缺陷，一元论的欲望完全建立在利己主义之上，这是一种幻想，而不是现实主义。例如，像休谟这样的敏锐观察者，怀疑在一个单一的利己主义原则上建立道德和社会秩序是否有意义。³

然而，这种说法的吸引力是显而易见的:如果我们对人类的动机和道德义务有一个系统的解释，而这些动机和道德义务都来自于普遍理性的利己主义这一看似不容置疑的前提，那么，一个无懈可击的解释，为什么接受道德义务的负担是合理的，就在我们的掌握之中。4然而，在非道德前提的基础上为道德辩护的利己主义项目的危险在于，为了使前面的理论的成立前提兼容，它可能会误解道德生活的丰富性，这样的描述要么是冒着提供与第一人称道德考量无关的道德解释的风险，要么他们以完全反直觉的方式重新解释最基本的道德判断以便与利己主义前提相适应。^5[2]

另一个观点放弃了在非道德前提的基础上为道德辩护的雄心。相反，只有站在道德主体的立场上。我们可以更广泛地衡量我们的义务和行动理由。“我们为什么要讲道德?”这个问题问错了。相反，我们应该问:“我应该做什么?”从这个角度来看，只是碰巧在一个给定的时间点，他人的利益可以为我提供行动的理由:我有理由做的事情并不取决于信仰和欲望的幸福结合。因此，道德理性的权威性和价值的现实性并不需要以个人利益和主观偏好为基础，但必须被视为理所当然。从这一观点来看，探究的焦点从动机问题转向了义务问题。这假设了我们有理由，至少在某些时候，把他人的利益置于自己的利益之上。

把别人的利益放在我们自己的利益之上是有无限的范围的，因此当代的正统观念倾向于对在严格的责任和那些属于广义的道德生活的更高级的美德之间进行区分。拒绝了基本的自我主义，在我们的道德推理中，考虑到他人的独立利益，我们认为道德本质上是一种调节人们利益的规则(责任)体系。

作为利己主义的对立面，利他主义是如何符合这种狭隘的道德责任观的呢?履行一个人的职责肯定需要至少有一些利他主义，在某种程度上，将道德的概念视为道德义务，而不仅仅是假设性的，命令性的预设，我准备从公正的立场来看待自我利益，并在适当的时候优先考虑他人的利益。从这个意义上说，利他主义是道德原则的核心。然而，我们对利他行为的直觉理解似乎包含了比其他更重要的东西——关注。因为我们倾向于认为利他主义是一种超越一般规则和社会期望的超越性美德。⁷

一个救生员救了一个溺水的游泳者似乎没有另一个游泳者那么无私。利他主义似乎包括做得比道德要求的更多。8改善发展中国家的贫困状况就是一个案例。献血则是另外一个。 一个只做他或她应该做的事情的人——从狭隘的角度来看——无论如何在道德上——肯定会认识到他人利益的重要性；但是他们似乎不是利他主义者。

因此，利他主义的现象似乎提醒我们在狭隘的道德观中利己主义的残余；它提醒人们旧的伦理观念，即构成更美好生活的价值观和美德。我们倾向于认为，利他主义的人为世界贡献了超越性责任基本要求的价值。

然而，有两个困难阻止利他主义融入美好或高尚的生活(相对于狭隘的道德价值观)。首先，尽管我们通常认为利他主义者为了他人的利益而牺牲自己的利益，但自我牺牲的整个概念对于更广泛的道德来说是令人烦恼。后一种观点认为，良好的表现不需要真正的牺牲，因为美德总是符合一个人的真正利益。从这个角度来看，因为我们优先考虑真正有价值的东西，而不是不那么有价值或只是表面的东西，所以“牺牲”是表面的。尽管这种无私的牺牲从狭隘的角度来看特别值得称赞，但从更宽泛的角度来看，她只是过着美好的生活——仅此而已。^[3]

第二个问题是，尽管利他主义现象指向的是一种超越了狭隘道德的简单要求的额外义务，后一种观点实际上可能是以破坏社会实践的方式，而社会实践是以很多日常利他主义的基础上更严厉和苛刻的方式。狭隘的道德以其当代流行的公正为幌子，确实需要做出相当大的牺牲。虽然责任和额外美德之间的对比表明，“真正的”利他主义对我们的要求比我们仅仅履行义务更多，一旦我们面对这样一种观点，即我们的职责制度应该从公正的立场出发，就会出现相反的关切。现在，职责开始显得过于苛刻，远非敷衍了事。一个典型的例子就是戈德温对公正的苛刻态度，他认为，如果一个人的母亲和开明的菲尼隆大主教在一幢燃烧的建筑物中面临死亡，一个人应该公正地评估对人类的好处，努力把好人大主教从火焰中拯救出来，让一个人的母亲死去。¹⁰

这里的问题不只是公正，是从根本上对自己的特别情感依附和表达怀有敌意，为了大家的利益，一个人不被允许优先于自身的义务，但是这些情感依附和表达是日常利他主义的组成部分。通过超越最低道德要求的方式，以各种方式照顾家庭、朋友、邻里和社区成员的利益，既加强了这些关系，又赋予了我们生活的意义。然而，就像戈德温的母亲一样，他们面临着一种严格的解释，即每个人的利益完全同等重要。这种道德观可能要求一个人牺牲自己的东西，其首先赋予了一个人的生命以意义，而许多人认为这是荒谬的。因此，公正似乎需要某种有问题的自我牺牲，这似乎和对美好生活的憧憬一样没有吸引力。^11[4]

对许多公正主义者来说，这要求太多了: 我们应该能够调和我们特别关注的相互矛盾的要求与公正的道德要求。例如，布赖恩bull;巴里试图通过区分一级和二级公正来做到这一点。¹² 苏珊·门德斯，努力解决二级公正和我们更关心的问题之间的冲突，并认为，如果我们想知道我们如何能被激励去做公正的事情，我们必须寻求建立在公正基础上，而不是建立在平等的抽象价值上，但是，矛盾的是，在非常局部的关注中，公正就变成了冲突。 在门多斯看来，我们对我们所依附的特定他人的关怀使我们公证。 这些部分的担忧中包含了道德因素 结果证明，它们是公正所要求的对人更普遍的尊重的起源。¹³ 这种说法之所以吸引人的理由，是因为公正作为一项正式原则，必须依附于这些更具体的考虑的价值， 因为，如果它们本身没有价值，那么我们就不应该如此极端地公正地衡量它们。 孟德尔正确地论证了这一点 我们需要显示出这种不公正和公正的关切并不是完全不连贯的，与此同时，不会将特定的问题分解成公正的关注，反过来也是如此。^14[5]

外文文献出处：Res Publica, 2003, Vol.9 (3), pp.213-222

附外文文献原文

CILLIAN MCBRIDE and JONATHAN SEGLOW

INTRODUCTION: EGOISM, ALTRUISM AND IMPARTIALITY ^y

ABSTRACT. The distinction between egoistic and altruistic motivation is firmly embedded in contemporary moral discourse, but harks back too to early modern attempts to found morality on an egoistic basis. Rejecting that latter premise means accepting that othersrsquo; interests have intrinsic value, but it remains far from clear what altruism demands of us and what its relationship is with the rest of morality. While informing our duties, altruism seems also to urge us to transcend them and embrace the other-regarding values and virtues constitutive of a good life. This rather wide conception of morality may strike us today as too demanding. At the same time, however, currently popular impartialist accounts of morality can disrupt much everyday altruism in their insistence that each personrsquo;s interests are weighed precisely equally. Having sketched this problematic of altruism, the second half of this Introduction outlines the arguments of the four papers and review essay in this collection, each of which, in a different way, negotiates the difficult relationships between egoism, altruism, morality and impartiality.

KEY WORDS: altruism, egoism, impartiality, morality

Everyday moral discourse remains dominated by a simple contrast between egoistic and altruistic motivation, a contrast which has arguably dominated modern moral philosophy since Hobbes. Today, the pamphlet- eers of popular science enjoi

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CILLIAN MCBRIDE and JONATHAN SEGLOW

INTRODUCTION: EGOISM, ALTRUISM AND IMPARTIALITY ^y

ABSTRACT. The distinction between egoistic and altruistic motivation is firmly embedded in contemporary moral discourse, but harks back too to early modern attempts to found morality on an egoistic basis. Rejecting that latter premise means accepting that othersrsquo; interests have intrinsic value, but it remains far from clear what altruism demands of us and what its relationship is with the rest of morality. While informing our duties, altruism seems also to urge us to transcend them and embrace the other-regarding values and virtues constitutive of a good life. This rather wide conception of morality may strike us today as too demanding. At the same time, however, currently popular impartialist accounts of morality can disrupt much everyday altruism in their insistence that each personrsquo;s interests are weighed precisely equally. Having sketched this problematic of altruism, the second half of this Introduction outlines the arguments of the four papers and review essay in this collection, each of which, in a different way, negotiates the difficult relationships between egoism, altruism, morality and impartiality.

KEY WORDS: altruism, egoism, impartiality, morality

Everyday moral discourse remains dominated by a simple contrast between egoistic and altruistic motivation, a contrast which has arguably dominated modern moral philosophy since Hobbes. Today, the pamphlet- eers of popular science enjoin us to view ourselves through the lens of evolution as genetically programmed to act in ways that will ensure the survival of our genes. Our most spontaneous and innocent actions such as falling in love are now radically redescribed in terms which reveal them to be no more than unconscious stratagems to ensure that our DNA makes it to the next stage in the ongoing competition that is human existence. The more sophisticated versions of this outlook seek not to debunk our common sense notions about love, friendship and civic virtue, but rather

y The papers in this issue were among those presented at the Association for Legal

and Social Philosophyrsquo;s annual Conference on The Ethics of Altruism at Royal Holloway, University of London, in April 2002. The conference produced lively and wide-ranging discussion on many different aspects of altruism. Some of these other aspects are explored in the papers collected in ed. J. Seglow, The Ethics of Altruism (London: Frank Cass, forthcoming). We are grateful to Bob Brecher for his help and encouragement in putting this special issue together.

Res Publica 9: 213–222, 2003.

copy; 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

to explain them as products of evolution which serve to make social life possible.¹

Such views are direct descendants of Hobbesrsquo;s project of setting polit- ical association on a firm and indubitable egoistic foundation and they invite us to replay later eighteenth century disputes about the nature of moral motivation between the party of virtue and the cynical “Hobbesist”. Behind the appeal to self-interest lies the same dream of society as a vast machine kept in motion by the mutually advantageous interactions of self- interested individuals which Mandeville lays out in his satire on virtue, the Fable of the Bees.² Others, while attracted by the model, doubted whether such a machine could be kept well regulated by self-interest alone – an attentive legislator would be required to oversee the mechanism. What, however, of the motives of the legislator himself? Whence comes his devo- tion not to his own good alone, but to that of the greatest number? If the altruistic motives of the overseer of the social machine can really be incor- porated into its workings then perhaps it is indeed capable of perpetual motion; but, if his motives are other-regarding, then perhaps there is a flaw in the design after all and the monistic desire to rest all on egoism is a fantasy rather than hard-nosed realism. A shrewd observer like Hume, for example, doubted whether it made sense to try to found morality and the social order on a single egoistic principle.³

The attractions of such an account, however, are plain: if we had a systematic account of human motivation and of moral duty derived from the seemingly indubitable premise of universal rational egoism then a watertight account of why it is rational to accept the burdens of moral obligation would lie within our grasp.⁴ The danger of the egoistic project of justifying morality on the basis of non-moral premises, however, is that it risks misinterpreting the richness of moral life in order to render it compatible with their founding premise. Such accounts either risk offering an explanation of morality which is irrelevant to first-person moral deliberation or they reinterpret first-order moral judgements in drastically

1. For an interesting attempt to provide an evolutionary account of morality see A. Gibbard, lsquo;Norms, Discussion, and Ritual: Evolutionary Puzzlesrsquo;, Ethics 100 (1990), 787–802.
2. Bernard de Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989 (1729)).
3. David Hume supplements self-interest with sympathy in the Treatise and in the Enquiries, in relation to the claims of the “Hobbesist”, notes lsquo;that love of simplicity which has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophyrsquo; – Enquiries into Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 298.
4. D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

counter-intuitive ways in order that they be rendered compatible with the egoistic premise.⁵

The alternative view abandons the ambition of justif

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